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LOVE OF LANDFILL: TRASHING THE
MAINE CONSTITUTION TO SOLVE A
GARBAGE PROBLEM'
I. INTRODUCTION
The human family is engaged in a noble struggle against the law
of entropy, seeking to turn back or at least retard the inexorable
process by which all matter in the known universe passes from useful to useless form. The political and legal system generally refers to

useless matter as solid waste; in Maine the Legislature has chosen to
wage this struggle against entropy and discourage production of en-

tropical by-products through the enactment of the state's first comprehensive waste management law, "An Act to Promote Reduction,
Recycling and Integrated Management of Solid Waste and Sound
Environmental Regulation" (hereinafter "the Act").2

In broad terms, the Legislature sought to discourage the production of solid waste through the establishment of a solid waste hierarchy that makes the reduction of waste generation the top priority,
and "land disposal of waste" the least preferable of five identified

alternatives to reduction.' The Act set forth ambitious recycling
goals 4 and established the Maine Waste Management Agency as the
1. The Author wishes to thank the following people, whose insight, comments,
and time were of invaluable assistance in the preparation of this Comment: Attorney
Martha Gaythwaite; T. William Glidden of the Maine Legislature's Office of Policy
and Legal Analysis; Professor Alison Rieser of the University of Maine School of Law,
Attorney Jeffrey A. Thaler, Maine Representative Sharon A. Treat; Henry Warren,
Director of the Office of Siting and Disposal Operations at the Maine Waste
Management Agency.
Thanks are also due to Maine Times, for unwittingly underwriting countless hours
of useful legal and field research on this subject during the Author's tenure as a staff
writer at the newspaper prior to undertaking the study of law.
2. P.L. 1989, ch. 585 (codified at ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 2100-2222 (West
Supp. 1991-1992)).
3. It is the policy of the State to plan for and implement an integrated approach to solid waste management, which shall be based on the following
order of priority:
A. Reduction of waste generated at the source, including both amount and
toxicity of waste;
B. Reuse of waste;
C. Recycling of waste;
D. Composting of biodegradable waste;
E. Waste processing which reduces the volume of waste needing land disposal, including incineration; and
F. Land disposal of waste.
M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2101(1) (West Supp. 1991-1992).
4. The Act specified that Maine should recycle 50% of its municipal solid waste
generated each year by 1994, with an "interim goal" of 25% to be achieved by 1992.
Id. § 2132(l).
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branch of state government with primary responsibility for achieving the goals of the legislation.5
The most controversial aspect of these reforms in solid waste policy has been, undoubtedly, the provisions mandating that the
Agency identify Maine's need for additional landfill capacity and
then proceed to build and operate such facilities as are needed to
meet this capacity.6 The Agency's initial effort -to choose two "special waste"'7 landfill sites, one in southern Maine and another in the
northern section of the state, was a failure; on January 9, 1992, the
Agency's Facility Siting Board unanimously rejected the last of the
proposed sites despite the Agency's expenditure of $400,000 in consulting fees and studies over a period of more than two years.3 The
Agency thus was unable to meet its statutory deadline of March 1,
1992 to identify disposal capacity sufficient to meet Maine's needs
through 1995. 9 By mid-1992, the Agency had changed course and
was openly admitting that there may not have been such a pressing
need for additional capacity after all; the official in charge of the
siting project admitted that a commercial facility just over the New
5.
6.
7.

Id. § 2102.
Id. §§ 2151-2164.
"Special waste" is defined as:
[A]ny solid waste generated by sources other than domestic and typical
commercial establishments that exists in such an unusual quantity or in
such a chemical or physical state, or any combination thereof, that may
disrupt or impair effective waste management or threaten the public health,
human safety or the environment and requires special handling, transportation and disposal procedures. Special waste includes, but is not limited to:
A. Oil, coal, wood and multifuel boiler and incinerator ash;
B. Industrial and industrial process waste;
C. Waste water treatment plant sludge, paper mill sludge and other sludge
waste;

D. Debris and residuals from nonhazardous chemical spills and cleanup of
those spills;
E. Contaminated soils and dredge spoils;
F. Asbestos and asbestos-containing waste;
G. Sand blast grit and non-liquid paint waste;
H. Deleted. Laws 1989, c. 869, § A-5.
I. High and low pH waste;
J. Spent filter media and residue; and
K. Other waste designated by the [Board of Environmental Protection], by
rule.
Id. § 1303-C(34).
In general, the "special waste" designation is designed to achieve a regulatory middle ground between garden variety municipal solid waste (i.e., common household
trash) and hazardous waste.
8. Jill Higgins, Biddeford-Arundel Spared as Dump Site, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Jan. 10, 1992, at 1.
9. Section 2154(1) of the Act initially set July 1, 1991 as the deadline for site
selection but the Legislature extended the deadline to March 1, 1992. P.L. 1991, ch.
243 (codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2154(1) (West Supp. 1991-1992)).
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Hampshire border would meet Maine's needs in the immediate future and the Maine siting project would therefore refocus on creating a "safety net" in the event the New Hampshire facility was no
longer available.10
This Comment represents an effort to assess Maine's landfill siting process, to identify constitutional flaws in the statutory and regulatory approach that contributed to the 1992 siting deadlock, and
to make proposals for legislative and regulatory reform designed to
address Maine's waste disposal needs while remaining sensitive to
environmental concerns and the unpopularity of solid waste facilities among their proposed neighbors. In essence, the recommendation is that Maine get out of the landfill business itself while adopting a series of strict safeguards designed to assure that entities
remaining in the landfill business do not site or operate their facilities capriciously.
IL

PRELUDE: TRASH TO CASH AND ASH

Nineteen eighty-six was a year of crisis for Maine with respect to
garbage. The advent of strict environmental regulations had brought
an end to the dominance of the "town dump" as the final resting
place for most of Maine's household trash. As a result, most Maine
municipalities had turned to the private sector to provide disposal
capacity via either commercially developed "secure" landfills" or
the construction of so-called "waste-to-energy" facilities that burn
garbage and generate electricity for sale to local utilities or steam for
local industry." Maine's two major commercial secure landfills"3
were the only facilities in the state that could legally accept ash
from local incinerators. Demand for commercial landfill space from
neighboring, more populous states also made it financially advantageous for Maine landfill operators to import waste from beyond
Maine's borders. A York County businessman therefore sought to
10. Telephone Interview with Henry Warren, Director of the Office of Siting and
Disposal Operations, Maine Waste Management Agency (July 13, 1992). For a further
discussion of the Agency's 1992 siting efforts, see infra notes 83-87 and accompanying
text
11. A "secure" landfill is one that includes a series of plastic and/or clay liners
and a system for the collection of leachate (meaning liquids leaching out of the disposed waste pile). Me. Dep't of EnvtL Protection Reg. 400, § 1 (AAAA) (May 24,
1989). The purpose of such safeguards is to prevent toxins from leaking into the
groundwater around the landfill site, a preventive measure that was wholly absent
from the unlined, municipal landfills that had been the norm for much of the twentieth century. Bill Breen, Lifting the Lid: Garbage Dictionary, GARBaE, Jan.-Feb.,
1992, at 13.
12. For an overview of Maine's solid waste situation at the close of 1986, see Don-

aid M. Kreis, Big Bucks, Big Promises:Boston University, Central Maine Power, and
a Lot of Others Apparently Got Taken In, ME. Tistas, Dec. 12, 1986, at A16.

13. The Consolidated Waste Services landfill is in Norridgewock and the Savwyer
Environmental Resources Facility is in Hampden.
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create a lucrative Maine commercial landfill monopoly by acquiring
control of the two existing landfills and developing a third site, the
so-called Hebo-Hybo landfill in Lebanon, Maine.1 4 The consumer
fraud and antitrust division of the state attorney general's office
eventually intervened to prevent such a market domination, 0 and
the Legislature responded with a one-year moratorium on landfill
development"6 followed, in 1987, with provisions designed to assure
that environmental permits would go only to those commercial landfills that met Maine's "capacity needs" rather than demand from
beyond the state's borders.'"
A test of this new capacity needs process came in 1988 when the
owners of Maine's two major privately developed waste-to-energy facilities, the Maine Energy Recovery Company (MERC) plant in Biddeford and the Penobscot Energy Recovery Company '(PERC) facility in Orrington, filed an application with the Board of
Environmental Protection (BEP) and the Land Use Regulation
Commission (LURC)' 8 to construct a landfill repository for ash and
other by-products. 9 The proposed location of the facility was a site
14. Kreis, supra note 12, at 16A-17A.
15. State v. Trainor, CV-87-260 (Me. Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., June 11, 1987) (Brody,
J.) (Consent Decree of William Trainor Sr.). Allegations of fraud also swirled about
the proposed monopoly, which was known as Eastern States Management. The demise of Eastern States Management began in the summer of 1986 when Central
Maine Power (CMP) abruptly cancelled preliminary plans to work with Eastern
States on developing a new waste-to-energy plant at CMP's Mason Station in Wiscasset. CMP apparently balked because the chairman of Eastern States had allegedly
sought to conceal his criminal record from utility officials. See Clark T. Irwin, Signature DisparityKills Deal, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Aug. 12, 1986, at B1. It is generally conceded that the controversy involving Eastern States Management, and the
emphatic local opposition to the proposed Hebo-Hybo landfill, contributed to the
sense in state government that waste disposal was in a state of crisis and required
prompt legislative action.
16. Donald M. Kreis, Trash Wars: Vague Laws and Phantom Dumps Suggest
That a Few Battles Remain, ME. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1987, at 2.
17. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1310-N(1) (West Supp. 1990-1991). The statute
requires the Maine Board of Environmental Protection (BEP) to license only those
landfills that provide a "substantial public benefit," defined as a facility that will
serve to satisfy the capacity needs identified pursuant to § 1310-0. Id. § 1310N(3)(A). Section 1310-0, since repealed, called for the BEP to analyze the state's
need for waste facilities every two years. See P.L. 1987, ch. 517, § 25. Section 2121,
added in 1989, now vests the responsibility for creating that analysis in the Office of
Planning of the Waste Management Agency. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2121
(West Supp. 1991-1992).
18. LURC functions as a zoning board for Maine's unorganized territories, which
would otherwise lack a local government to make land use decisions. ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 683-689 (West 1982 and West Supp. 1991-1992).
19. The other by-products consist largely of "front-end waste," meaning waste
that was considered unsuitable for combustion, as opposed to ash, which is what remains of the burned waste following combustion. Me. Dep't of Envtl. Protection Reg.
400, § 1(NN) (May 26, 1989).
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in Township 30 in Washington County, Maine's easternmost
county.20 While the Township 30 proposal was pending, the Legislature's Energy and Natural Resources Committee in 1989 replaced
the "capacity needs" and "substantial public benefit" tests with the
comprehensive solid waste act which, while retaining the earlier effort to assure Maine landfills were built only to house Maine waste,
placed this requirement in the broader context of ambitious recycling goals and a waste management hierarchy designed to slow
Maine's waste "stream" to a trickle under the direction of the new
Maine Waste Management Agency."'
It appears to have been significant from a policy standpoint that
the Legislature crafted the waste management act against the backdrop of the ultimately unsuccessful Township 30 proceeding. There
was speculation that the Township 30 developers had chosen their
site not with environmental suitability or even proximity to the
waste generators as an important criterion, but with the notion that
they could foist their unpopular residue on an area without sufficient population or political influence to oppose the facility successfully.22 This created a perception that the selection of landfill sites
should no longer rest in private hands and that government's role
should be expanded from mere site permitting to site selection, all
to ensure that objective, scientific criteria, rather than business or
political considerations, become the driving force in siting
2
decisions. 1
20. See Tux Turkel, Battle Over Ash Dump Plan a Classic Case of NIMBY, MF.
Nov. 13, 1988, at A19. For an account of the ensuing public hearings, see Donald M. Kreis, Landfill Wars: The First Township 30 Dump Hearings
Prove To Be Less than Meets the Ear, M& Tihms, Dec. 9, 1988, at 20; Donald M.
Kreis, The Rhetoric of Doom: Round 2 of the Landfill Hearings in Machias Was Not
for the Faint of Ear, Ma. TunAs, Mar. 17, 1989, at 20.
21. See supra note 4.
22. For instance, Turkel, supra note 20, concludes that a landfill site "must be off
the beaten path" as "a nod to NIMBY." The article quotes an official of the proposed
landfill as saying that the developers chose their rural site "not to avoid the NIMBY
situation, but to affect as few people as possible." Id. at A19. Several months later,
Randall Parenteau, Operations Manager at the Maine Energy Recovery Company
(MERC) incinerator in Biddeford, Maine, addressed this issue more squarely in a
letter to the Biddeford-Saco Journal Tribune. "[T]he public outcry from the HeboHybo landfill process raised great concerns as to whether a landfill could ever be built
in Southern Maine by a private company. The attempt to locate in Township 30 was
geared to offset the 'not in my backyard' mentality." Randall J. Parenteau, Letter to
the Editor, BmDEFORD-SAco J. TRm, Mar., 1989.
23. See, e.g., Hearings on L.D. 932 and L.D. 1341 Before the Maine Legislature's
Energy and NaturalResources Comm., 114th Legis., 1st Sess. (statement of Paula
Clark, Director, Bureau of Solid Waste Management of Maine Dep't of Envtl. Protection) (on file with the Maine Legislature's Office of Policy and Legal Analysis). Clark
told the paneh
Siting has become a very difficult and sometimes contentious issue. The
decision making process is difficult for all concerned parties: abutting propSUNDAY TELEGRAMt,
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Another effect of the Township 30 proceeding was the perception
among lawmakers that local opposition could and would stymie the
development of facilities that, while meeting the disposal needs of
the state as a whole, were targeted for environmentally suitable areas in communities or regions that may not require the facility to
meet local disposal needs. Thus, the legislators rejected an approach
advocated by the Natural Resources Council of Maine (NRCM) that
would have vested the siting power not in a centralized state agency,
but in regional authorities.2 '
The Legislature's enactment of the solid waste act in 1989 was
followed later that year by unanimous rejection of the Township 30
landfill by both the BEP and LURC. As a result, the apparent need
for landfill capacity for residue from the MERC and PERC incinerators became the first test of the new Waste Management Agency's
site selection process.2 5
The 1990 provisions followed detailed consideration of plans submitted by the governor's office and NRCM. Both plans focused on
selection of landfill sites at the regional level, as opposed to the state
level. NRCM emphasized public participation. The enacted bill prohibited development of new commercial landfills, but decided that a
statewide agency, the Maine Waste Management Agency Facility
Siting Board, would make the siting decisions. Environmental pererty owners, citizens living in the area of the proposed facility, and the developer. To citizens affected by the development of a new waste facility it
often seems that decisions related to siting are made haphazardly without
clear analysis of the best available site choices.
24. In arguing for this proposal, NRCM made clear its belief that local authority
over waste management decisions should be enhanced rather than reduced. The environmental group argued for "regional waste management and recycling plans [to bej
adopted with substantial municipal and citizen input, and potential host communities
[to] retain intervention and local zoning and enforcement rights." Id. (statement of
Sharon Treat, Lobbyist for the Natural Resources Council of Maine) (on file with the
Maine Legislature's Office of Policy and Legal Analysis).
25. This was the case although it is by no means clear that such a special waste
landfill was the state's most critical waste disposal need in the eyes of-the Legislature.
Following the Waste Management Agency's announcement that the development of
special waste landfills for incinerator residue would be the first task of the Agency's
Facility Siting Board, the Legislature responded by amending § 2156 of the Act to
clarify legislative intent. P.L. 1991, ch. 517, § C-2. One significant change came to
Section 2156, specifying that landfills for municipal solid waste, rather than special
waste, should be the top priority of the Waste Management Agency. The original
language of Section 2156 stated that the Agency "shall develop facilities sufficient to
meet the projected needs identified in the analysis conducted under former Section
1310-0 and the state plan and to serve all geographic areas of the state." P.L. 1989,
ch. 585, § 7. The amendment clarified that the Legislature meant projected needs
"for municipal solid waste," and added this sentence: "On or before January 1, 1995,
the office may develop facilities sufficient to meet the projected needs for special
waste identified in the analysis conducted under former Section 1310-0 and the state
plan and to serve all geographic areas of the State." P.L. 1991, ch. 517, § C-2 (codified
at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2156 (West Supp. 1991-1992)).
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mitting would remain with the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP).
HI.

SITING CRITERIA AN AMBIGUOUS GARBAGE "CONDUIT"

The U.S. Supreme Court observed nearly sixty years ago that the
separation of powers doctrine forbids the Legislature from abdicating "the essential legislative functions with which it is [constitutionally] vested" to an executive branch agency. 26 But this proscription
does not deny the legislative body
the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the
making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of27facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature
is to apply.

The Maine Legislature sought to meet this test when it vested
landfill siting authority in the Waste Management Agency and its
Facility Siting Board by enumerating seven criteria that are to guide
the site selection process.28 These criteria include: proximity to
waste generators, proximity to transportation systems, consistency
with projections of demand for landfill space, consistency with other
waste management objectives, the existence of a fair and reasonable
price for the proposed site, conformity with environmental standards set jointly by the BEP and LURC, and compatibility with adjacent land uses.29 Facially, such a detailed set of legislative directions meets the constitutional requirements set forth by both the
U.S. Supreme Court and the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, has
declared in State v. Dube that "[t]he agency must be given clear
standards to prevent the exercise of authority beyond the scope intended by the legislature and to assure that the citizen is protected
against arbitrary or discriminatory action by public officials.""0 In
that case, a legislative mandate to promote public safety on highways and efficient performance by carriers was sufficient to allow the
state Public Utilities Commission to require truck drivers working
26.
27.
28.
29.

Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935).
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935).
ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2153 (West Supp. 1990-1991).
Id.

30. State v. Dube, 409 A.2d 1102, 1104 (Me. 1979) (citing Schechter Corp. v.
Tinited States, supra note 26, and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, supra note 27, and
State v. Boynton, 379 A.2d 994 (Me. 1977)). See also Maine Real Estate Comm'n v.

Kelby, 360 A.2d 528, 532 (Me. 1976) (real estate licensing standards could be held
void for vagueness if they forced people of common intelligence to guess at the meaning of the standards) and Danish Health Club v. Town of Kittery, 562 A.2d 663, 666
(Me. 1989) (a massage ordinance that could have been drafted with greater precision
does not necessarily violate the vagueness doctrine).
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for common carriers to be at least twenty-one years old. More recently, in the environmental context, the court decided Swift River
Co. v. Board of Environmental Protection, approving a BEP decision not to license a hydroelectric dam where the BEP's decision
was based on the delegated authority to deny permits if such a proposal "diminishes the significant resource values of the river or
stream segments." 31 The court observed that it would be "difficult to
conceive of any clearer statement" and noted that "[t]here is no ambiguity in the word 'diminishes.' ,31

Is Section 2153 of the waste management act similarly unambiguous? Clearly, the fact that the Law Court found clarity in a oneword instruction, "diminishes," does not mean that the siting criteria, purporting to contain seven separate instructions from the Legislature, is necessarily more clear than the directive the court found
unambiguous in Swift River. The Swift River court also found "articulable criteria" in the Maine Department of Conservation's 1982
Maine Rivers Study, which the Legislature had adopted by specific
33
reference in the statute.

In fact, the directives in Section 2153 are arguably an order of
magnitude more vague than the simple direction to the BEP to permit no dams that diminish any of the values articulated in the 1982
Maine Rivers Study. The first two siting criteria, proximity to generators and proximity to transportation systems, are binding on the
agency in its site selection decisions only "to the extent possible."' 8
The "capacity or size" of the proposed facility "must be consistent
with the projected demand as determined in the state plan.

'3 s

It is

not clear whether this means the facility must meet all or part of
that demand. The proposed site "must meet preliminary environmental standards developed jointly by the [D]epartment [of Environmental Protection] and the Maine Land Use Regulation Commission, including ground water and geological standards."3 0 This is
presumably designed to cause the Agency to choose sites that are
likely to sustain subsequent permitting review by the DEP and
LURC. But sites that meet the permitting standards of the relevant
regulatory agencies are not necessarily the optimal sites from an environmental standpoint. The doctrine of Schechter, Panama Refining and its Maine analogues suggests that it is for the Legislature,
not environmental permitting agencies, to identify the optimal envi31. 550 A.2d 359, 361 (Me. 1988) (quoting

ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.

12, § 403 (West

Supp. 1987)).
32. Id.

33. Id.
34.
35.
36.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2153(I)(A) and (B) (West Supp. 1991-1992).
Id. § 2153(1)(C).
Id. § 2153(1)(F)
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ronmental characteristics of state-owned waste disposal sites."
The argument against Section 2153 on vagueness grounds is the
opposite of the one presented by the plaintiffs in Swift River, who
contended that the Legislature's directive to the regulatory agency
was too brief to achieve sufficient clarity. Here the directive is actually seven different policy preferences, potentially mutually exclusive, and the statute offers no guidance as to which preferences are
to take precedence over the others.3 8
The Law Court has indicated that it is not necessary to provide

precise standards to an agency in every conceivable situation, holding in the 1974 case of Finks u. Maine State Highway Commission

that a general directive to enhance "natural scenic beauty" was sufficient guidance to the State Highway Commission in the exercise of
eminent domain:
[I]n such cases in which the statutory enactment of detailed specific standards is impossible, the presence of adequate procedural
safeguards to protect against an abuse of discretion by the administrators of the law, compensates substantially for the want of precise legislative guidelines and may be taken into consideration
in
0
resolving the constitutionality of the delegation of power.'

Given the specificity of Section 2153, it does not appear that landfill siting constitutes an area in which the enactment of specific stat-

utory standards is impossible. But assuming, arguendo, that such
standards are beyond the ability of the Legislature to articulate, a

credible argument can be made that the solid waste act does not
contain adequate procedural safeguards to protect against abuse of
37. It should further be noted that from a practical standpoint the ostensible aim
of this provision would have been well served by adding the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the United States Army Corps of Engineers to the list
of agencies developing preliminary standards, since those two federal agencies enjoy
the right to veto the development of any site within the wetlands jurisdiction of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. See Water Pollution Prevention and Control (Clean
Water) Act § 404 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988)).
38. For example, an agency with an obstructionist attitude toward landfills could
opt to develop only those sites that are immediately adjacent to one or more waste
generators, citing the proximity criterion as paramount; the agency could choose to
develop only sites that are within a half mile from an interstate highway, citing the
"proximity to transportation" criterion; an agency with a zealous desire to develop
special waste landfills could project a demand using very liberal criteria and then
develop sites accordingly;, or the agency could adjust its definition of a "fair and reasonable" price (ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.38, § 2153(1)(E) (West Supp. 1991-1992)) to
fit its desire to develop a site or sites-all in full compliance with the Legislature's
directives regarding siting criteria. While Section 2153 requires the Waste Management Agency to implement the criteria by rule, thus putting the requirements of administrative procedure as a check on Agency caprice with respect to siting, the
Agency is still wholly free to weigh the already vague legislative criteria as it sees fit.
39. 328 A.2d 791, 796 (Me. 1974).
40. Id. (footnote omitted).
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discretion. There are ample opportunities for opponents of a specific
site, or opponents of the policies that drive a siting choice generally,
to bring that opposition to bear on the environmental permitting
process. The site selection process does not provide for that kind of
public participation. The regulations of the Waste Management
Agency, while providing for public participation in formal proceedings before the Facility Siting Board, 41 provide no avenue for the
public to challenge the decision to conduct a specific facility search
in the first place. Neither is there a mechanism for the public to
participate in the creation of either the capacity needs analysis that
triggers such a search or the waste management plan that is supposed to guide such an endeavor. In fact, there is no formal role for
the public in the selection process until that process reaches the "finalist" stage. The candidate sites are presented by agency staff to
the Siting Board.
What informed the court's holding in Finks was the justices' previous and exhaustive consideration of the delegation issue in City of
Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Association.42 The court found itself evenly divided on the question of whether a state law requiring
binding arbitration in employment disputes between teachers and
school districts did not furnish the arbitrators with adequate stan41.

Me. Waste Management Agency Reg. 401, § 5(G) (1991), provides:
To assist the Agency in collecting the information needed to make technically sound and informed decisions, it is the policy of the Agency to conduct its proceedings in a manner that encourages and facilitates participation by the general public. Any member of the general public . . . may
participate in an Agency proceeding by reviewing and commenting on petitions, applications or other filings. In addition, public participants have the
right to:
1. have notice of the proceeding...
2. obtain access to non-confidential Agency files and records concerning
any proceeding;
3. participate in any pre-hearing meeting or conference;

4. participate in any hearing as a public witness or intervenor . . . and
5. have notice of and submit comments on any draft decision prepared by
the presiding officer.
See also Me. Waste Management Agency Reg. 401, § 6(K), which specifies that
public participation 6hall be governed by the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, MFL REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 9054 (West 1989), and Me. Waste Management
Agency Reg. 401, § 6(L), authorizing formal intervenor status for "any person showing that he or she is a member of a class which is or may be substantially and directly
affected by the proceeding."
42. 304 A.2d 387 (Me. 1973). The Finks court explicitly distinguished Biddeford
Teachers, noting that the State Highway Commission is a public body, unlike the
private parties (arbitrators) who had allegedly received the improperly delegated authority in the Biddeford Teachers case. Finks v. Maine State Highway Comm'n, 328
A.2d at 795 n.2. Superficially, the delegation in the Waste Management Act is more
like Finks than Biddeford Teachers since the Facility Siting Board is a public body.
It bears noting, however, that much of the substantive selection-making in the 19891992 special waste landfill search became the province of hired consultants.
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dards. The statute was therefore not voided on this basis, but the
court decided the case by finding that the arbitrators had exceeded
their statutory authority in their resolution of several substantive
issues in dispute. 43 Happily for students of the delegation doctrine,
this division prompted Justice Wernick to write a lengthy opinion
tracing the history of unconstitutional delegation and striving for an
appropriate means to consider such a matter in areas that represent
theretofore uncharted extensions of the Legislature's police
powers. 4"
Wernick noted that it was the philosopher John Locke who contributed the notion that "[t]he Legislature neither must nor can
transfer the power of making laws to anybody else,'4 as a safeguard
against absolutism.4" But, Wernick continued, the arrival of the pol-

icy complexities inherent in industrialization strained the 18th and
19th Century notion that administrative agencies were simply
factfinding bodies. This notion, Wernick said, became a "fiction,"'
so courts evolved a delegation doctrine that allowed legislatures to
cede what amounts to lawmaking authority to agencies "so long as
consent of the governed is channeled through the legislature to be a
continuing indirect source of control over the actions of a body not
immediately responsible to the people."'" The linchpin of what Wernick called a "conduit" principle was the requirement that the Legislature articulate a49 "primary standard" for the administrators to
adopt as their own.

Thus, Wernick concluded, transfer of power itself will not rise to
the level of constitutional infirmity.
[I]t is rather the manner of the transfer-whether it places unbridled legislative authority in a body not responsible to the electorate and thus precipitates the potential for an absolutism of power
(the primary evil apprehended by Montesquieu and Locke to require the protections embodied
in the concepts of "separation" and
0
"checks and balances").5

Wernick found it necessary to undertake such a careful analysis of
delegation doctrine because the Biddeford Teachers court faced a
situation in which the Legislature had extended the police power
into a new realm-contractual relations with government employees. 51 The siting provisions of the Maine Waste Management Act
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

City of Biddeford v. Biddeford Teachers Ass'n, 304 A.2d at 403.
Id. (Wernick, J., agreeing in part and disagreeing in part).
Id. at 404.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 405.
Id.
Id. (citing Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
Wernick suggested that such an exercise is not truly a "police" function:
For one hundred fifty years the "unconstitutional delegation" doctrine
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require a similar exercise in "pioneering analysis," 5 which Wernick
defined as attention to the extent to which the Lockian underpinnings of delegation analysis have "reasonable applicability"
to the
53
particular kind of police power being exercised.
[A]ssessment must be made of whether the powers here granted
...operate in a domain so attenuated [to the Legislature's] relationship to "law-making" activity-and, therefore, outside areas
likely to precipitate the kinds of value judgments which demand
channeling the consent of the governed through the legislature as a
continuingly operative control-that insistence upon a "primary
standard" or "intelligible principle" becomes realistically
unnecessary."
It would seem beyond question that the siting of publicly owned
landfills precipitates the kind of value judgments described
above-perhaps to an even greater extent than more traditional exercises of police power would. The virulent opposition that has accompanied every attempt to site a special waste landfill in Maine
since 1986 speaks for itself on this issue. So, too, does the intense
interest on the part of industry, environmental and regional organizations in the ongoing debate over solid waste policy and priorities.
Wernick agreed in Biddeford Teachers that arbitrating public
school teachers' contracts is an exercise of police power that requires
at least an "intelligible principle" to guide the regulators. °0 He
found that intelligible principle in the Legislature's decision to exclude questions of educational policy from the arbitrators' realm
(leaving working conditions and hours within their purview), 0 a
contention the opinion of the opposing plurality rejects.5 7 Writing
for the opposing plurality, Justice Weatherbee hinted that "the tohas been developed largely in relation to the sovereign's exercise of "police
power" externally to control and regulate private personal and property
rights.
In the instant statute sovereignty appears in a different role. Here, its
contours are directed fundamentally inward to meet internal problems arising from governmental functioning as an "employer" of "employees" in the
"business" of providing essential services to the public.
Id. at 403.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 408.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 409.
56. Id. at 414.
57. Id. at 400. It should be noted that, although Justice Weatherbee's opinion
appears in the ATLANTIC REPORTER as the opinion of the Court, with which Justice

Wernick's opinion is "agreeing in part and disagreeing in part," id. at 403, it is the
Wernick opinion that states the view with precedential value as to the vagueness issue. This is not readily apparent from reading the published opinions and I am grateful to Justice Wernick for clarifying this point in a personal conversation about the
case.
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tality of legislative expression" might yield such an intelligible principle. Weatherbee suggested that the "intelligible principle" standard would not necessarily satisfy our own constitutional demand
for standards in this case."8
The landfill siting provisions of the Maine Waste Management
Act satisfy neither the Wernick intelligible principle nor the test articulated by Weatherbee. The Act's ostensible statement of purpose,
found in the waste management hierarchy delineated in Section
2101, has no meaningful application to the landfill siting process. 0
The Section 2153 standards themselves are too vague and potentially contradictory to furnish such an intelligible principle. And
while they appear to be specific standards, thus facially satisfying
the test set forth by the Biddeford Teachers majority, closer examination reveals them to be without substance.
In sum, the landfill siting provisions as written create the kind of
tyrannical situation that Locke and the constitutional framers
feared would result from situations in which the Legislature abdicates its authority as the people's representative. The law allows the
Waste Management Agency and the Facility Siting Board nearly unfettered discretion in siting landfills that are not necessarily in the
public interest nor even consistent with the objectives of the Waste
Management Act.
IV. THE AGENCY'S WHIMSICAL SITING

CRITERIA

Due process requires that an agency must not be "unduly arbitrary or capricious" in the exercise of its legislatively delegated authority.6 0 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has not had occasion
to articulate the standard to any greater detail in the context of a
regulatory agency.
The Maine solid waste act may provide such an opportunity. Assuming the validity of the criteria enumerated in Section 2153, the
record is ambiguous at best as to whether the Waste Management
Agency and the Facility Siting Board were not arbitrary and capricious in their implementation of the statutory mandate-either in
the rules formally adopted by the Agency and Board or in the decisions made under the aegis of those rules.
Governing the process used by the Agency and the Facility Siting
58. Id.
59. One example of such a meaningful application would be a requirement that

the Agency demonstrate that it has affirmatively subjected the would-be landfihled
waste to the five disposal priorities (reduction, reuse, recycling, composting, and volume reduction) that precede landfilling on the statute's pecking order. Another would
be a requirement that any landfill facility or search process also make provision for
the implementation of the other, higher, waste management priorities.
60. Seven Islands Land Co. v. Maine Land Use Regulation Comm'n, 450 A.2d 475,
483 (Me. 1982) (citing State v. Rush, 324 A.2d 748, 752-53 (Me. 1974)).
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Board during their initial attempt to site disposal facilities were the
so-called Chapter 450 Rules"1 adopted by the Facility Siting Board
on May 16, 1990.62 These rules set forth the siting criteria adopted
as required by Section 2153 of the Waste Management Act. The
Board then sought to translate the seven statutorily imposed policy
prescriptions into a series of "exclusion and preference criteria."03
The exclusion criteria in their entirety sought to implement the
"preliminary environmental standards" developed jointly by the
BEP and LURC pursuant to Section 2153(1)(F) of the Act, and
dealt with groundwater hydrology, surface water hydrology (including proximity to protected water bodies and wetlands), natural areas
(i.e., wildlife refuges and management areas), protection of scenic
and recreational resources, and protection of archaeological and historical resources." There were no exclusionary criteria based on failure to be consistent with projected demand, failure to "be consistent
with, and actively support" the state's official waste management
objectives, or lack of a fair and reasonable price for the site-the
three other Section 2153 criteria that are exclusionary in character."'
Thus, pursuant to the 1990 regulations, it would have been possible
for the Facility Siting Board to fail to exclude sites that do not meet
those three statutory standards. 6 When the Agency and the Facility
61. Me. Waste Management Agency Reg. 450 (May 30, 1990). These rules cover
the siting of both disposal and incineration facilities, but for purposes of this Comment analysis will be limited to the sufficiency of the disposal siting provisions
promulgated pursuant to Section 2153 of the Waste Management Act.
62. The 1990 version is no longer in effect. On August 19, 1992, the Facility Siting
Board adopted an extensively rewritten version of the siting rules. Me. Facility Siting
Bd. Reg. 450 (Aug. 19, 1992). For a discussion of the effect of the 1992 revisions, see
infra, notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
63. Me. Waste Management Agency Reg. 450, § 1 (May 30, 1990).
64. Id. § 5(A). The preliminary environmental standards themselves appear as an
appendix to the Chapter 450 Rules, with the notation that the standards "appear for
informational purposes only" and are not part of the actual rules. Me. Waste Management Agency Reg. 450 (May 30, 1990) (Appendix). The letter of transmittal, written by the two submitting agencies and accompanying the standards, emphasizes that
the standards "are not to be construed as to be more than a general guide to sites
that have a higher probability of gaining approval from the Commission and Department." Id. § A-2.
65. ME.REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2153(1)(C)-(E) (West Supp. 1991-1992).
66. It appears to be the view of the Agency itself that another serious flaw in the
exclusionary standards contributed significantly to the failure to site a landfill during
the initial search. Section 5(A)(3)(f) excludes from consideration "those sites that require the filling of a combined total of more than ten acres of ... wetlands." Me.
Waste Management Agency Reg. 450 (May 30, 1990), § 5(A)(3)(f). Henry Warren,
Director of the Agency's Office of Siting and Disposal Operations, commented: "This
limit seemed, by inference, to imply that filling of ten acres would be acceptable when
in fact no such determination had been made. The ten acre limit was apparently
based on a verbal statement from a federal agency staff person that proposals for
filling above that level would require a full blown Environmental Impact Statement
process with a hearing." Office of Siting and Disposal Operations, Special Waste
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Siting Board substantially revised the Chapter 450 Rules in 1992,
they did not address this problem. 7
Conversely, the 1990 preference criteriae authorized the Board to
give preference to criteria that are properly considered exclusionary
pursuant to Section 2153. The standards relating to hydrogeology
(both surface and sub-surface), geology, natural areas, scenic and
recreational resources, archaeological resources, and historical resources were all adopted pursuant to the Section 2153(1)(F) requirement that the site meet preliminary environmental standards. That
the Legislature intended these standards to be mandatory, rather
than preference criteria, is clear from the existence in the same section of explicit preference criteria relating to the proximity of sites
to waste generators and transportation systems. 0 Again, the 1992
revision of the Rules does not address this issue.70
A similar, though more egregious, problem existed with respect to
the criterion that
give[s] preference to sites that will be consistent with and actively
support other waste management objectives, including waste reduction and recycling. Site screening and selection must account for
the need to integrate disposal facilities into the overall management of solid waste and the achievement of the state's solid waste
and recycling goals. Solid waste landfills should, whenever appropriate, be located to accommodate waste reduction, recycling and
composting facilities at the same location 7
This is in conflict with the statute's affirmative declaration that
Landfill Site Selection Process, Evaluation and Recommendations (Jan. 17, 1992). at
4. Warren and other commentators agree that the focus on choosing sites with wetland soils (driven by hydrogeological preference criteria that drove the site selection
process toward wetlands) doomed the process. Id. See also the comments of Kyla
Bennett of the United States Environmental Protection Agency in Dieter Bradbury,
Dump CriteriaDoomed Search from the Start, M. SUNDAY TELEGRAm, Jan. 12, 1992,
at 1. In practical terms, the problem is that the hydrogeological criteria recommended
by the state regulatory agencies drove the Agency toward wetlands, the development
of which federal agencies can veto under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. Water
Pollution Prevention and Control (Clean Water) Act § 404 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§
1251-1387 (1988)). This is a problem that also haunted the private developers who
chose the Township 30 landfill site in 1987. See Donald M. Kreis, Landfill Wars: The
First Township 30 HearingsProve To Be Less than Afeets the Ear, Ma.TmEs, Dec.
9, 1988, at 20. A common-sense question is why the Board did not realize it was
confronting the same conundrum that had contributed to the failure of the last commercial siting proposal some three years prior to the adoption of the Chapter 450
Rules. A relevant legal question is why the Board was promulgating regulations apparently based on ad hoc conversations with federal officials rather than the statutory
criteria.
67. Me. Facility Siting Bd. Reg. 450 (Aug. 19, 1992).
68. Me. Waste Management Agency Reg. 450, § 5(B) (May 30, 1990).
69. MR REv. STAT. ANN. tit, 38, § 2153(1)(A) & (B) (West Supp. 1991-1992).
70. Me. Facility Siting Bd. Reg. 450, § 4(B) (Aug. 19, 1992).
71. Me. Waste Management Agency Reg. 450, § 5(B)(8)(j) (May 30, 1990).
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"[a] site and its considered use must be consistent with, and actively
support, other waste management objectives, including waste reduction and recycling."72 It also conflicts with the waste management
hierarchy set forth in Section 2101. This hierarchy is properly
viewed as the statement of the Legislature's overall purpose in enacting the legislation and manifestly not a mere "preference" for the
Waste Management Agency in any of its enterprises. And, as with
the problems discussed above, the 1992 revisions of the Chapter 450
Rules do not address this inconsistency. 73 In fact, it would not be
untenable to suggest that the 1992 revisions were enacted chiefly to
make landfill siting easier, rather than to7assure
that the siting pro4
cess conforms to the legislative mandate.
Several Agency decisions made pursuant to the 1990 regulations
during the special waste landfill search process also appear to have
no basis in the regulations and were also arguably without support
in the statutory mandate. The most significant of these decisions
was the Agency's determination that it would focus its initial siting
process on special waste capacity. The original language in Section
2156 of the Act, authorizing the initial site development process, did
not mention special waste but, rather, required the Facility Siting
Board to seek disposal capacity sufficient to meet the State's needs
generally.7 5 Although much of the public controversy that led to the
enactment of the Solid Waste Act concerned incinerator ash and
other special waste, it was not reasonable to infer from the actual
statutory language that the Legislature wished the Agency to make
special waste landfills the top siting priority. To reinforce the unreasonableness of such an inference, the Legislature in 1991 amended
Section 2156 to read that the 1995 facility development deadline applied only to facilities needed for "municipal solid waste," thereby
emphasizing that
the lawmakers were not requiring special waste
7
landfill siting.
72.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2153(1)(D) (West Supp. 1991-1992) (emphasis

added).
73.

Me. Waste Management Agency Reg. 450, § 4(B)(10) (Aug. 19, 1992).

74. For an extensive colloquy with respect to this allegation, consult the Basis
Statement appended to the final version of the 1992 edition of the Chapter 450 Rules.
Me. Facility Siting Bd. Reg. 450 (Aug. 19, 1992) (Basis Statement). E.g., the Agency

stated that its purpose was to "clarify" the process rather than make it easier to site
landfills, and further stressed the notion that the preference criteria are not binding
on the Agency. Id. at 3. The Agency also attempted to refute the allegation that the
changes make it easier to select sites requiring the filling in of some wetland areas. Id.
at 5-6.

75.
76.

P.L. 1989, ch. 585, § 7.
P.L. 1991, ch. 517, § C-2. The amended text of § 2156(1) reads:
Initial state facility required. On or before January 1, 1995, the office

shall develop facilities sufficient to meet the projected needs for municipal
solid waste identified in the analysis conducted under former section 13100 and the state plan and to serve all geographic areas of the State. On or
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In light of the amendment, there is considerable puzzlement as to
why the agency pressed on with its search for special waste facilities
for as long as it did. Section 2156 authorizes facility development
only to meet identified in-state capacity needs, and by the fall of
1991 the Agency possessed abundant evidence that the special waste
"crisis" that had grabbed headlines from 1987 to 1990 had
abated-if it had, in fact, ever existed at all.7" Nevertheless, the
before January 1, 1995, the office may develop facilities sufficient to meet
the projected needs for special waste identified in the analysis conducted
under former section 1310-0 and the state plan and to serve all geographic areas of the State.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2156(1) (West Supp. 1991-1992) (new language in
italics).
Subsection 2 of Section 2156, authorizing subsequent development of solid waste
facilities, was similarly amended to emphasize that the Agency is required only to
develop facilities for municipal solid waste, and that development of special waste
facilities is a discretionary matter as long as the agency has identified a need for such
facilities. Id. § 2156(2).
77. The 1990 "State of Maine Waste Management and Recycling Plan," adopted
by the Waste Management Agency pursuant to Sections 2122-2223 of the Waste
Management Act, identified "disposal capacity for ash from several of the state's
waste-to-energy facilities" as "the most pressing need at the state level." Me. Waste
Management Agency, State of Maine Waste Management and Recycling Plan (July,
1990), at 74. The Plan went on to state that the MERC and PERC incinerators would
run out of ash disposal capacity by mid-1991 and that a new incinerator being built
in Auburn would also require ash disposal capacity. Id. at 74-75. Formal update of
this Plan and its estimates is not required until two years after its publication. See
Me. Rev. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2122(2) (West Supp. 1991-1992).
MERC and PERC did not run out of ash disposal space; in fact, the MERC facility
in 1991 signed a longterm disposal contract with the Consolidated Waste Services
landfill in Norridgewock operated commercially by Waste Management, Inc. Interview with Henry Warren, Director, Office of Siting and Disposal Operations (Jan. 17,
1992). PERC was in the process of making a similar arrangement. Id. The "Maine
Special Waste Capacity Siting Process Update," issued by the Agency in October of
1991, stated that the new Auburn incinerator had also made ash disposal plans and
that the Auburn facility's requirements were no longer being included in the projected capacity needs for state facilities. Me. Waste Management Agency, Maine Special Waste Capacity Siting Process Update (Oct. 1991) at 7.
The October 1991 revision, which Warren confirmed was the document being used
by the Agency and the Facility Siting Board in pinpointing the capacity needs to be
met by the proposed landfills, strongly suggests that the Agency was seeking to develop facilities for which the need was speculative at best. The 1991 report begins its
discussion of capacity needs by misidentifying "special waste disposal capacity" as
"the state's most pressing disposal need" as declared in the 1990 Waste Management
and Recycling Plan. Id. at 2. As noted above, the 1990 report stated that ash disposal
was the critical need. The distinction is significant because the 1991 revision confirms
that municipal incinerator ash is only 8.5% of Maine's annual production of special
waste. Id. Of the 2.2 million tons of special waste Maine is believed to generate a
year, fully half is paper mill sludge, much of which is not even landfilled. Id. at 3. At
the time of the 1991 Update, the five major generators of paper mill sludge were
either operating their own landfills or seeking permits to operate them. Id. at 4. (Recall that the Waste Management Act prohibits the development of new commercial
landfills but does not prohibit commercial generators of waste to construct landfills to
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Agency continued to state publicly that it believed there was an
"acute" need for the state to develop special waste facilities immediately."5 Not only did the Legislature expect the Agency to focus on
municipal solid waste rather than special waste, but it prohibited
the Agency from developing facilities for which there was not a specifically identified need-a missing element as the Agency worked to
narrow its list of potential sites in the last half of 1991.
Also without real basis in statute or regulation was the Agency's
decision to limit its search to areas within a 50 mile radius of the
MERC facility in Biddeford and the PERC incinerator in Orrington.79 The stated reason for this decision was the mandate in
Section 2153(1)(A) of the Waste Management Act to locate disposal
facilities near the waste generators that will use the facilities if possible.80 This had an air of political convenience, since it seemed to
address the vociferously stated concerns from past siting controversies that communities were being asked to accept incinerator ash
that the communities had no part in generating. Defining and bifurcating the search in this manner also had the effect of making each
of the state's two major population areas (defined roughly as Cumberland and York counties in the south and greater Bangor area to
the east) the target of a landfill search. But this criterion was arbitrary in that it did nothing to assure that these special waste facilities would, in fact, be located in proximity to the majority of waste
generators since MERC and PERC together account for just 92,000
of the 2.2 million tons of special waste generated in Maine each
year.81 Moreover, the Agency had every reason to believe that
MERC and PERC would not even be using the landfills the Agency
82
was seeking to develop.
meet their own needs.)
Thus, in the fall of 1991, the Agency knew it was required by statute to develop
facilities for which there was an officially determined capacity need. However, the
Agency was actually seeking to build facilities for which the "official" need was only a
small percentage. That need, incinerator ash disposal space, effectively no longer existed, and the need for other kinds of special waste disposal capacity was uncertain at
best.
78. Sherry Huber, Executive Director of the Maine Waste Management Agency,
stated on November 6, 1991 that "[t]he situation regarding disposal capacity has not
improved since ... the adoption of the 1990 Waste Management and Recycling Plan.
The Agency's most recent analysis of available disposal capacity for special waste is
that the need for reliable disposal capacity is more acute than originally realized."
Public Hearing re Site No. 19, Alton, Maine, Nov. 6-7, 1991, State of Maine Waste
Management Agency Facility Siting Board, Record of Proceedings, Part III, at 341.
79. See, e.g., Waste Management Agency Begins Site Selection Process, (Me.
Waste Management Agency, Special Waste Landfill Site Selection Project, Augusta,
Me.), Oct. 1990, at 2.
80. Id.
81.

ME. WASTE MANAGEMENT

AGENCY,

MAINE SPECIAL WASTE

CAPACITY SITING

PROCESS UPDATE 2 and 4 (Oct. 1991).
82. An ambiguity in the statute itself also deserves mention in this context. "To
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A highly ironic footnote to the failed siting saga came to light in
mid-1992, when the Agency announced that it had found a site it
wanted to develop, located in a remote section of Eastern Maine on
land owned by a major paper company that would, presumably, not
be a hostile landowner."3 That, of course, is precisely what the
Township 30 landfill developers had sought to do. The Township 30
site had been located on land owned by the Georgia Pacific Corporation some 90 miles east of Bangor; the new "Carpenter Ridge" site is
60 miles north of Bangor on land owned by the Lincoln Pulp and
Paper Company.8

the extent possible, a site shall be located in proximity to the entities that generate
the wastes placed at the site." ME. REv.STAT. ANN. tit. 38 § 2153(1)(A) (West Supp.
1991-1992) (emphasis added). Since the Legislature used the word "entities" rather
than "municipalities," it is not clear whether the statute contemplates special waste
landfills in proximity to the actual garbage generators or the waste-to-energy plants
that generate the actual waste to be placed at the special waste sites. This reflects a
policy tension that has dogged Maine regulators and lawmakers: Who bears responsibility for incinerator ash from commercial facilities like MERC and PERC, the forprofit owners of the incinerators or the municipalities that rely on the commercial
incinerators for waste disposal? MERC and PERC promoted themselves as an inexpensive and complete solution to municipal trash troubles; only after signing longterm contracts with dozens of communities and constructing the incinerators with
tax-exempt financing did the owners declare that they faced an ash disposal crisis
that, they argued, the state ought to solve. See Donald M. Kreis, Don't Throw Away
This Story, MF Tmas, June 17, 1988, at A8, A9, quoting the Vice President of the
firm that developed MERe and PERC threatening bankruptcy over ash disposal
problems. Ultimately, MERC and PERC used the threat of bankruptcy not to site
landfills but to renegotiate its contracts with municipalities, increase disposal fees
paid by towns, and presumably use the added revenue to purchase additional space
and commercially available special waste facilities.
83. Jill
Higgins, Porter Cut from Landfill Search, PORTLAND PREss HERALD, July
11, 1992, at 1. By July of 1992, the Agency and the Facility Siting Board were considering a pair of.sites that had been volunteered by their owners. One, rejected by the
Board at the urging of the Agency, was located in the southwestern Maine town of
Porter, near the New Hampshire border, and had been the focus of earlier efforts by
its owner to build a commercial landfill at the site. The other, which became the only
site under active consideration as of July 1992, was located on land owned by the
Lincoln Pulp and Paper Company about 60 miles north of Bangor. Id. The Agency,
however, conceded that the immediate need to site a special waste landfill had abated
(thanks, in large part, to the availability of large scale amounts of permitted capacity
in the Turnkey Landfill, operated by Waste Management, Inc., just over the Maine
border in Rochester, New Hampshire) and that the Agency was pressing ahead with
its siting project to create a "safety net." Telephone Interview with Henry Warren,
Director of Siting and Disposal Operations, Maine Waste Management Agency (July
13, 1992) [hereinafter Interview with Henry Warren]. "We need to get a site permitted and then sit on it," Warren said. Id. This, of course, raises the question of
whether "safety net" siting is what the Legislature envisioned when it required the
Agency to create facilities based on the state's documented capacity needs.
84. See supra note 22.
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"CHURLISH OBSTINACY" AND EMINENT DOMAIN

The abrupt halt in the landfill siting process in early 1992, or at
least the effort to impose such a facility on unwilling landowners
located in uncooperative communities, left a nagging question unresolved. Before the Agency decided to find a willing host in a paper
company,85 four potentially affected municipalities and three potential landfill abutters filed suit in Kennebec County Superior Court
against the Waste Management Agency claiming a variety of procedural and constitutional infirmities."' The broadest and most intriguing claim of this mooted proceeding was that the agency's proposed exercise of eminent8 domain
to acquire special waste landfill
7
sites was unconstitutional.

85. The Lincoln Pulp and Paper Company would be a major user of any such
facility and, thus, has a business incentive to volunteer its land for a waste facility
that the state would bear the expense of getting permitted. The company even volunteered to remove and treat all the leachate from the Carpenter Ridge site, if it is
developed. Interview with Henry Warren, supra note 83.
86. Town of Arundel v. Maine Waste Management Agency, CV-91-457 (Me.
Super. Ct., Ken. Cty., Dec. 18, 1991) (Chandler, J.). In addition to Arundel, plaintiffs
included the City of Biddeford and the Towns of Alton and Herman, all of which
were being considered as possible host municipalities at the time the suit was filed in
September, 1991. See generally, Plaintiffs' Amended Petition for Review of Final
Agency Action. Id.
87. Although the Facility Siting Board's decision on January 9, 1992 to withdraw
the proposed Arundel-Biddeford site (the last one on the list of potential sites) from
consideration rendered the lawsuit moot, the suit had actually been dismissed several
days earlier by the Superior Court, which granted without comment the defendants'
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the actions complained of did not constitute
"final agency action" within the meaning of the Maine Administrative Procedure Act,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8002(4) (West 1989 & Supp. 1991).
But in cases where an agency's actions are "[p]reliminary, procedural, intermediate
or other[wise] nonfinal," id. § 11001(1), judicial review of such action is permitted "if
review of the final agency action would not provide an adequate remedy." Id.
"[N]onfinal agency decisions are reviewable only when review of the final action
would be ineffective." Northeast Occupational Exch., Inc. v. Bureau of Rehabilitation, 473 A.2d 406, 409 (Me. 1984) (citations omitted). By "ineffective" the Law Court
meant that subsequent review of the final action would not prevent the nonfinal action from causing "irreparable injury" by "attach[ing] legal consequences to action
taken in advance of other hearings and adjudications that may follow. . . ." Id. at
410; see Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 425 (1942).
A municipality named as a "candidate site," at least under the process utilized by
the Maine Waste Management Agency during its most recent landfill siting search,
has arguably suffered the requisite irreparable injury, or will have suffered it prior to
the final Agency action. Regardless of the ultimate outcome of the Agency's landfill
siting process, the Agency's decision to impose "semifinalist" status on several municipalities threatened social and economic upheaval that would not be erased by failure to be ultimately selected as a host community.
Courts should refrain from "entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over
administrative policies, and also [should] protect .. agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a
concrete way by the challenging parties." Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 14849 (1967). But the Maine Waste Management Agency apparently reserved for itself
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The question of how a landfill siting procedure can conform to the
constitutional requirements for eminent domain is one of first impression, both in Maine and, apparently, any other U.S. jurisdiction.
The courts and Legislature will therefore find limited guidance in
judicial precedent, despite explicit constitutional language. Amendment V of the U.S. Constitution provides, in relevant part, that
"private property shall [not] be taken for public use without just
compensation." Article I, § 21 of the Maine Constitution similarly
provides that "private property shall not be taken for public uses
without just compensation, nor unless the public exigencies require
it."
The actions of the Waste Management Agency meet the federal
requirements for eminent domain, as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court. Nearly 40 years ago in Berman v. Parker," the Court
declined to invalidate a District of Columbia urban renewal plan,
even though the land proposed for taking was to be used for private
commercial purposes. The Court found a valid exercise of police
power in the enabling legislation's goal of urban beautification. 8
"Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to
realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the
power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end." 00
The justices articulated a policy of extreme deference to the legislature with respect to the declared purpose for exercising eminent
domain. "[W]hen the legislature has spoken, the public interest has
been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive .... The role of the judiciary in determining whether that power is being exercised for a
public purpose is an extremely narrow one. ' '
In subsequent decisions the Court has not found occasion to deviate from this principle or to limit its application. For example, most
recently in 1984, the Court found the requisite public purpose in the
federal requirement that pesticide companies disclose health, safety
and environmental data, even though such disclosure resulted in
public release of valuable trade secrets. 2 Acknowledging that the
users of these data will arguably be other pesticide companies rather
than the general public, the Court nonetheless found the taking to
the right to resume consideration of a non-chosen candidate site in the event the
originally chosen site(s) did not gain the approval of the permitting agencies (Le., the

Board of Environmental Protection and the Land Use Regulation Commission).
"Semifinalist" status as a candidate site creates concrete effects on a community in
reduced property values and general upheaval, but if such "semifinalist" status is
held to be non-concrete for purposes of judicial review then a community would be
without recourse so long as the Agency has not declared its decision to be "final"
88. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).

89. Id. at 33.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 32.
92. Ruckelshlus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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be constitutional because the Court has "rejected the notion that a
use is a public use only if the property taken is put to use for the
general public."'
The language of the Maine statute meets the articulated tests for
federal constitutionality. The Waste Management Agency's enabling
legislation authorizes the Facility Siting Board to seek landfill facilities sufficient to meet specifically identified need for such disposal
capacity in light of the statutorily defined hierarchy of waste management priorities.94 Although "land disposal of waste" is the last in
the hierarchy of six waste management options, the fact that the
Legislature has identified this at all is sufficient to meet the high
court's public purpose test. Likewise, the fact that only a few commercial waste management operations are likely to use the proposed
facilities does not violate the federal constitution. 5
The "public exigency" test in the Maine Constitution, however, is
more exacting, as reflected by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's
more narrow view of eminent domain. A legislative declaration of
"public use" will not suffice in Maine. The public exigency requirement protects Maine citizens from incursions that, while conducted
through an instrumentality of government, meet a need that is more
correctly characterized as private:
As between individuals, no necessity, however great, no exigency,
however imminent, no improvement, however valuable, no refusal,
however unneighborly, no obstinacy, however unreasonable, no offers of compensation, however extravagant, can compel or require
any [person] to part with an inch of [her] estate.9
The Law Court has long recognized that the Legislature is free to
determine what constitutes an "exigency" without judicial intervention as long as there is a rational basis for such a determination. It
is permissible for the Legislature to delegate to an agency the determination of which particular properties should be taken to meet
such an exigency.98 But the question of whether the intended use is
public or private is very much a subject for judicial review.11
93. Id. at 1014 (citing Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243-44 (1984);
Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155
(1921)).
94. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 2101 and 2154 (West Supp. 1991-1992).
95. See generally, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
96. Brown v. Warchalowski, 471 A.2d 1026, 1029 (Me. 1984) (quoting Bangor &
Piscatiquis R.R. Co. v. McComb, 60 Me. 290, 295 (1872)) (County Commissioner
could not use eminent domain to take land where the taking was for private use).
97. Ace Ambulance Serv. v. City of Augusta, 337 A.2d 661, 663 (Me. 1975). See
also Hayford, v. City of Bangor, 102 Me. 340, 343 (1907); Kennebec Water Dist. v.
City of Waterville, 96 Me. 234, 245 (1902).
98. Rubin v. W.H. Hinman, Inc., 253 A.2d 708, 711 (Me. 1969).
99. Brown v. Warchalowski, 471 A.2d at 1033; Ace Ambulance Serv. v. City of
Augusta, 337 A.2d at 663; Paine v. Savage, 126 Me. 121, 124 (1927); Brown v. Gerald,
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Historically, the Law Court has been ambivalent about finding the
requisite public use. For example, with the industrial revolution
sweeping through Maine, the court in the 1872 case of Allen V. Inhabitants of Jay enjoined a town from appropriating private property so that a lumber mill might move to the town.100 "All security
of private rights, all protection of private property is at an end...
when the power is given to a majority to lend or give away the property of an unwilling minority," bristled Chief Justice Appleton on
behalf of a unanimous court.'01
Does the public exigency require the building of a new saw mill [in
Jay]? If there are such public use and public exigency, then anybody's land ...

may be taken from [her] by vote of the town, and

leased to a lessee to be selected and voted for by the majority, and
[her] money may be wrested from [her] by the tax gatherer ....
[T]he doctrine that this right of eminent domain existing for every
kind of public use, or for such use when merely convenient, though
not necessary,
does not seem to me, by any means, clearly
10
maintainable. 2

But thirty years later, in Kennebec Water District v. City of Waterville, the court permitted a municipal water district to seize an
entire private water company, pausing to remind the parties that
eminent domain is an "inherent attribute of sovereignty" and the
Maine Constitution "does not confer the power, but by implication
recognizes it as existing in the state."''
There is, however, a principled distinction to be drawn between
Allen and Kennebec Water District. In the later case, the benefits
accruing to the public by ownership of its water company were direct and widespread; in Allen the benefits were both speculative and
indirect. The court made that distinction an explicit one quickly
thereafter, ruling in Brown v. Gerald0 ' that the generation and
transmission of electric power was not a sufficiently public use to
justify the taking of property by eminent domain. 0 5 "[T]he
100 Me. 351, 360 (1905); Kennebec Water Dist. v. City of Waterville, 96 Me. at 24142; Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me. 124, 140 (1872).
100. Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Me. at 140.
10L Id. at 134. Appleton went on to state that he understood that the Allen case
also hinged on whether the town's actions were a valid exercise of the taxation power.

"[Tihe power of taxation, as well as the right of eminent domain, has its limits, which
cannot be constitutionally transcended." Id.
102. Id. at 136.
103. 96 Me. 234, 242 (1902).
104. 100 Me. 351 (1905).
105. Id. Such a holding is obviously anachronistic. But in 1905. the use of elec-

tricity in Maine was so limited that the benefits of an electric utility could hardly be
described as public within the meaning of "public exigency." Commentators recognize
that the concept of public exigency is an evolving one; the Maine Waste Management
Agency need not establish that its proposed public use is one that the framers of the
Maine Constitution had foreseen. See Opinion of the Justices, 231 A.2d 431, 434 (Me.
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[L]egislature . . .cannot make a private use public by calling it
S0."1o6

The Gerald court's analysis focuses on an element that is critical
to the analysis of eminent domain in the special waste landfill context. In Gerald the court explicitly rejected the notion that public
use "may rest merely upon public benefit, or public interest, or great
public utility. . . .Something more than mere public benefit must
flow from the contemplated use."' 10
The Facility Siting Board's enabling legislation authorizes the
board to site landfills that meet projected landfill needs identified
under Title 38, Section 1310-0 (since repealed"'8 ) and the state recycling plan authorized by the act.0 9 (The provisions of Section
1310-0 required the Maine BEP to conduct a detailed study of the
state's landfill "capacity needs.") It is these analyses of the state's
landfill requirements that establish whether the proposed landfills
selected by the Facility Siting Board provide the "substantial public
benefit" required for their licensing by the Department of Environmental Protection. 10 While this "substantial public benefit" is presumably a valid criterion for environmental suitability, Gerald suggests that such a determination will not establish the requisite
public use for purposes of demonstrating a public exigency. In fact,
if this substantial public benefit is incidental to what is primarily
"an aid to private enterprise," then a law providing for such an exercise of eminent domain is "not legislation, but robbery.""'
More recent cases have refined this doctrine. In Crommett v. City
of Portland, the City of Portland's exercise of eminent domain for
slum clearance was a valid public exigency because public use "may
be negative in character. . . .The prevention of evil may constitute
a . ..public use." ' 2 But the court in that case still distinguished
between "public use" and mere "public advantage.' 1 '1 Relying on
Crommett, the Supreme Judicial Court in 1967 advised the Maine
Senate that there was no constitutional bar to a proposed law conferring on municipalities the right to take property to construct
public parking facilities. 11 4 Such facilities are a valid public use, not
just because the public would enjoy full access to them, but because
1967); Crommett v. City of Portland, 150 Me. 217 (1954). The question of when something like electric power crosses the threshold from private to public use is of interest,
but need not be resolved here.
106. Brown v. Gerald, 100 Me. 351, 360 (1905).
107. Id. at 370.
108. P.L. 1989, ch. 585, Part E, § 29.
109. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2154 (West Supp. 1991-1992).
110. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1310-N(1)(B) (West Supp. 1991-1992).
111. Brown v. Gerald, 100 Me. at 371 (citation omitted).
112. 150 Me. 217, 233 (1954).
113. Id. at 234.
114. Opinion of the Justices, 231 A.2d 431, 433-34 (Me. 1967).
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"[t]he whole public will achieve the prevention of such impediments
to safety and welfare as interference with fire and police protection
and the safe and free movement of traffic upon the public ways. ' ' 15
Crommett "narrowed the gap" between the constitutionally-required public use and the less stringent standard of public benefit." 6 But the court chose not to eliminate that gap altogether, recognizing that the need for flexibility does not obviate the court's
responsibility to set and maintain limits on the exercise of eminent

domain."'
Permitting an exercise of eminent domain for the development of
special waste landfills would, under present circumstances, go beyond the limit heretofore delineated by the Law Court. The Crommett case involved the clearing of "blighted" urban areas, a strategy
that may, in hindsight, appear to have failed in achieving the de-

sired urban "renewal" but which contained the necessary public
purpose in the sought-after improvement in city-wide quality of life.

This kind of benefit would not accrue to the public by virtue of the
development of the proposed landfills; municipalities would continue sending their solid waste to incinerators as before and continue paying contractually-determined rates for such disposal. The
only change is that these private incinerator companies, plus other
commercial generators of special waste, would reap economic gain
115. Id. at 434.
116. Id.
117. Two other jurisdictions, both with an historical view of eminent domain that
is as strict as Maine's public exigency test, found occasion during the explosion of
urban problems of the 1970s to declare that the gap between public use and public
benefit remains an important one. The Supreme Court of Kentucky in 1979 invalidated that state's law granting municipalities an unconditional right to condemn land
for private industrial development, rejecting outright the argument that "public benefit" is the equivalent of "public use." City of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d
3, 7 (Ky. 1979). The Supreme Court of South Carolina acknowledged that the concept
of what constitutes a public use ought to be a flexible one taking into account changing social conditions, but nonetheless ruled a jurisdiction that takes a restrictive view
of eminent domain must find something more than just public benefit to allow such a
taking. Karesh v. City Council of Charleston, 247 S.E.2d 342, 345 (S.C. 1978) (ruling
that a city cannot condemn land and lease it to a private corporation wishing to develop a parking facility, convention center, and retail stores). "However attractive the
proposed complex, however desirable the project from a municipal planning viewpoint, the use of the power of eminent domain for such purposes runs squarely into
the right of an individual to own property and use it as [sihe pleases." Id. at 345. In
other words, changing social conditions have not undermined the value of heeding
warnings from early in this century (and before) that without some standard for determining whether "the enterprise or improvement.., might contribute to the comfort or convenience of the public ... there would be absolutely no limit on the right
to take private property." City of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d at 6 (citing
Chesapeake Stone Co. v. Moreland, 104 S.W. 762, 765 (Ky. 1907)). This is arguably
why the Maine Supreme Judicial Court has not chosen to overrule the cautious pronouncements about eminent domain the court laid down almost 90 years ago in
Brown v. Gerald.
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by not needing to ship their special waste to other facilities which
would be more distant and more expensive.
Assuming for the sake of argument that avoiding such a need to
ship, and providing such an economic advantage, is a legislatively
determined exigency (and therefore a political determination the
court will not review), the question of public access to the proposed
facilities is relevant to the determination of whether the exigency is
a public one. The Gerald court stated that it is "not necessary that
all of the public should have occasion to use [the proposed facility].
It may suffice if very few have, or may ever have, occasion," so long
as the public enjoys a "right to use" it.1 18 Although it may indeed

suffice that any member of the public with special waste to dispose
would enjoy the right to use the landfills, this in no way resolves the
question of when there is sufficient public use.
In that light, it is instructive to distinguish between the public
parking facility the Maine Justices found acceptable in their 1967
Opinion of the Justices and one found unacceptable by the Delaware
Supreme Court in Wilmington ParkingAuthority v. Land with Improvements." 9 In finding a valid exercise of eminent domain,
Maine's highest court emphasized the "full access" of the public to
both the parking and the benefits to public welfare.120 In the Delaware case, the municipality proposed a parking facility that was
nominally open to the public but which, the record demonstrated,
was actually designed expressly to meet the demands of a major local employer for better employee parking.1 21 If the public's right to
use had been the end of the inquiry, the court would not have
reached the unconstitutional appropriation of private property expressly for private use.
The Delaware court resolved this dilemma by declaring that
"when the exercise of eminent domain results in a substantial benefit to specific and identifiable private parties, 'a court must inspect
with heightened scrutiny a claim that the public interest is the predominant interest being advanced.' "122 This is an appropriate approach for Maine in the present context as well, as is the view of
three federal circuits that "a taking will be nullified as not being for
a public purpose when it is demonstrated 2that a public entity acted
in an arbitrary manner or in bad faith."'

118. Brown v. Gerald, 100 Me. at 373.
119. 521 A.2d 227 (Del. 1986).
120. Opinion of the Justices, 231 A.2d at 434.
121. Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Land with Improvements, 521 A.2d 227, 229-30
(Del. 1986).
122. Id. at 231 (quoting Poletown Neighborhood Ass'n. v. City of Detroit, 304
N.W.2d 455, 459 (Mich. 1981)).
123. Amen v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789, 798 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1101 (1984); United States v. 416.81 Acres of Land, 514 F.2d 627, 631-32
(7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Agee, 322 F.2d 139, 142 (6th Cir. 1963). This is by no
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Here the court is presented with a Wilmington Parking Authority-type problem overlaid, at least potentially, with the brand of arbitrariness that justified nullification in the view of the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Amen v. City of Dearborn.12 4 The Facility Siting
Board's enabling legislation was enacted in 1989 in response to a
perceived landfill impasse, where the state's two major commercial
incinerators (MERC in Biddeford and PERC in Qrrington) argued
that they faced imminent bankruptcy because their joint effort to
site a private special waste landfill in Washington County was failing. The landfill siting program of the Waste Management Agency
was created as a direct response to the commercial need for special
waste landfill space articulated by MERC and PERC.1 8 In 1989,
both MERC and PERC cited financial difficulties in demanding renegotiation of their contracts with client municipalities.120 Many
municipalities responded by choosing to dispose of their solid waste
elsewhere, 127 a development that attenuates the finding of public exigency vis & vis special waste landfills even further.
The Law Court's most recent discussion of the public exigency
test came in Brown v. Warchalowski in the context of a request by a
landowner for the local selectmen to facilitate access to the landowner's holdings by laying out an easement over a neighbor's property along the course of a previously discontinued town way. 128 The
court found this a constitutionally insufficient public purpose. "The
exigencies of particular individuals in the enjoyment of their own
means a universally accepted view of the law of eminent domain. See, for example,
Public Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Shaklee, 784 P.2d 314, 318-19 (Colo. 1988) (en banc), in
which the Colorado Supreme Court found the requisite public purpose in an electrical

transmission line that would solely benefit the Coors brewery, even where public access to the line was theoretically available but extremely difficult logistically for other

commercial users of electricity. In addition, see Nicrosi v. City of Montgomery, 406
So. 2d 951, 952 (AI

1981), in which the Alabama Supreme Court stated that the

judiciary should defer to legislative declarations of public purpose. But note that
neither the Colorado nor Alabama constitutions include the "public exigency"
requirement.

124. Amen v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d at 798 (taking should be nullified when it
is arbitrary or imposed in bad faith).
125.

See generally, MAINE

LEGISLATURE STUDY OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEIENT AND

DISPOSAL Poucy (1987) and the testimony presented to the committee at its hearings
on the solid waste bills that gave rise to the enacted legislation.
126. Ted Cohen, Town Wondering How to Pay for MERC Hikes, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD, Oct. 24, 1989, at 1, 10. See also Donald M. Kreis, Waste Not: The
Struggling MERC and PERC Plants May Be Worth Sauing, MAINE TwAs, Nov. 24,
1989, at 16.
127. Commercial landfills in Norridgewock, Maine and Rochester, New Hampshire have apparently taken up much of this waste disposal slack. Also taking part is
the quasi-municipal Regional Waste Systems incinerator in South Portland, which
operates its own special waste landfill and apparently does not share the MERC and
PERC ash disposal dilemma.

128. Brown v. Warchalowski, 471 A.2d 1026 (Me. 1984).
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property will not in and of themselves suffice to permit state, county
or municipal action, in appropriating the land of another for road
purposes." 12 9 The same reasoning applies for landfill purposes,
where the agency exercising the right of eminent domain has not
demonstrated that the proposed facility will do anything more than
serve the exigencies of particular individuals in the enjoyment of
their own property.
"The [Maine C]onstitution protects the owner of property to the
extent of 'churlish obstinacy.' "130 The landowner-plaintiffs in Town
of Arundel v. Maine Waste Management Agency were churlishly
obstinate when it came to the siting of a special waste landfill, a
phenomenon some commentators have characterized as the
"NIMBY syndrome."13' 1 But the framers of the Maine Constitution
created the requirement of public exigency precisely to protect
property owners who wish to assert what some now characterize as
NIMBY rights. When the owners of MERC and PERC persuaded
Maine municipalities to "privatize" their garbage disposal by contracting with a private incinerator, MERC and PERC did not gain
the right to have their business needs defined as a public exigency.
VI.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE: GARBAGE

Is

NOT BAITFISH

A primary, though unstated goal, of the Maine Solid Waste Act
was to prevent the importation of waste from other states for disposal in Maine.13 2 The Act achieves this objective by banning the de129. Id. at 1029.
130. Id. (quoting Bangor & Piscatiquis R.R. Co. v. McComb, 60 Me. 290, 295
(1872)).
131. "NIMBY" is an acronym for "Not In My Back Yard." One commentator has
blamed a statewide "NIMBY" reaction, exacerbated by fear of economic exploitation
from non-Maine forces, as having been a decisive factor in the demise of the last

effort to site a private landfill for special waste before such siting was reserved for the
Waste Management Agency. Orlando E. Delogu, "NIMBY" Is a National Environmental Problem, 35 S.D. L. REV. 198, 206, n.27 (1990).

132. It appears that legislators and their staffs took care not to make this goal
explicit, fearing that any mention of such an objective would supply evidence to support a Commerce Clause challenge to the siting provisions. But the Study of Solid
Waste Management and DisposalPolicy in Maine, conducted in 1987 for the Legis-

lature's Energy and Natural Resources Committee, the document that led to the passage of the 1989 Act, makes clear the committee's keen interest in limiting waste
importation to the extent allowable by Commerce Clause considerations. MAINE LEGISLATURE, STUDY OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL POLICY IN MAINE

(1987).

"It is ... the committee's intent that the siting and development of solid waste disposal capacity in Maine be driven primarily by the needs of Maine's citizens and

businesses." Id. at 9. The legislators who drafted that study were guided by legal
advice stating that "[t]he state may not statutorily prohibit the importation into and
disposal in Maine of out-of-state solid waste; however there may be other options for
controlling imported waste which may be available to the State." Memorandum from
Peggy Reinsch of the Office of Policy and Legal Analysis (July 1, 1980) reprinted in
MAINE LEGISLATURE STUDY OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT

AND DISPOSAL POLICY IN
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velopment of any new commercial solid waste facilities, 33 and limiting the BEP's authority by allowing the Board to permit only solid
waste facilities that meet in-state "capacity needs."' 3'
It has been settled law since the Supreme Court decided City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey135 that the Commerce Clause of the
U.S. Constitution prohibits the states from banning the importation
of solid waste.
[T]he evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well
as legislative ends.... . [W]hatever [a state's] ultimate purpose, it
may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason,
apart from their origin, to treat them differently. 30

The Supreme Court has also held, however, that a state may avoid
the restraints of the Commerce Clause by functioning not as a market regulator, but as a market participant. 3 7 "Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and
exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.'-"
What remains unresolved is whether the market participant doctrine applies to a state that is not merely a market participant, but a
monopoly participant. The Philadelphia court expressly declined
comment on such a possibility."'
MAINE, app. B at 1 (1987).
133. MF REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2158 (West Supp. 1991-1992).
134. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2157 (West Supp. 1991-1992). This section ap-

plies not only when the Waste Management Agency is the permit-seeker as a result of
its own site selection process, but also when the applicant is "any other party." Id. §
2157(1)(A). Pursuant to the ban on commercial development in Section 2158, the
only other parties with the potential to file an application are either municipal or
regional governmental entities, existing solid waste facilities seeking a permit to expand existing capacities, or commercial entities seeking to create solid waste disposal
capacity to meet their own needs (rather than with the intent of marketing that disposal capacity to others). Id. § 2158.
135. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
136. Id. at 626-27.
137. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (state could impose more stringent requirements on out-of-state processors of scrapped vehicles
when the state's role was that of offering a bounty for abandoned cars) and its progeny, e.g., White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U.S.
204 (1983) (city could require construction projects it funded to be performed by a
workforce of at least 50 percent city residents) and Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429
(1980) (state-owned cement plant could sell only to state residents due to cement
shortage). But see South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984)
(state could not require that timber taken from state lands be processed in-state prior
to export). This amounted to "downstream regulation" of the timber-processing market (as opposed to the timber-harvesting market) in which the state was not a participant. Id. at 99.
138.- Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. at 810 (footnotes omitted).
139. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 627 n.6.
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An interesting and thorough discussion of this problem appears in
Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County.140 The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that a county's attempt to preserve its landfill capacity for local residents, achieved via the
county's policy of charging a higher price to non-local customers using the county-owned landfill, met the market participant exception
to Commerce Clause scrutiny.14 2 The panel expressly rejected the
argument that the county was engaged in impermissible "downstream regulation" designed to have an effect not on the market in
which the state was participating but on other markets. 42 But the
court based that holding on the fact that the price differentials complained of "do not pertain to the operation of private landfills and
do not apply beyond the immediate market in which Lycoming
transacts business. "143 Given that Maine's solid waste act not only
regulates private landfills but effectively prohibits them, the reasoning in Swin arguably does not apply. The statute is vulnerable to
attack as downstream regulation because the limitations imposed on
the market in which the state is participating (the siting and development of landfill capacity) is arguably focused "downstream" on
1 4
the use of Maine's landfill capacity for non-Maine waste.
The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island has had
occasion to consider whether there should be a "monopoly exception" to market participant doctrine when a state bans foreign waste
from its landfill and that landfill is the only available facility in the
state. 145 The court, in a decision unreviewed by higher authority, declined such an invitation, seeing "no distinction between this monopoly and the monopoly the State and its municipalities hold in
educational services, or in police and fire protection. 1 48 But, unlike
140. 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990).
141. Id. at 250-51.
142. Id. at 250 (citing South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82
(1984)).
143. Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d at 250.
144. The court validated the disputed regulation because "Lycoming's conditions
on what garbage may be dumped in its landfill do not, by their own terms, regulate
what may be done with the garbage outside of the market transactions in which
Lycoming is engaged." Id. at 251. Thus, with respect to the distinction between

downstream regulation and market participation, "Lycoming clearly falls on the market participant side of the line." Id. But note the court's dicta, observing that no
court has ever compelled city-owned garbage trucks to collect waste from beyond the
city limits. "We see no constitutional reason why a city cannot also limit a city-operated dump to garbage generated by city residents," the Swin court stated. Id. Garbage collection is more properly viewed as the provision of a municipal service rather
than a participation in a market, and the relevant question is not whether a city may
keep non-resident garbage off its trucks and out of its landfills, but whether the city
can keep foreign trash out of all trucks and landfills functioning within the city
limits.
145. Lefrancois v. Rhode Island, 669 F. Supp. 1204 (D. R.I. 1987).
146. Id. at 1212.
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in Maine, the existence of the monopoly in Rhode Island was not in
itself a matter of statutory policy; the court noted that four landfill
license applications were pending in Rhode Island at the time of the
1987 ruling and, therefore, "Rhode Island has done nothing more
than purchase a natural resource, i.e., the landfill
site, and offer to
147
its customers the service of waste processing."
The district court that decided Lefrancois distinguished the situation in that case from the scenario in City of Philadelphiaby noting
the distinction between "the market in waste processing,-a service-and the market in landfill sites," which comprise a natural resource. 148 The court noted that the New Jersey statute invalidated
by the Supreme Court excluded out-of-state garbage processors
from both markets, where the Rhode Island statute only keeps outsiders from the market in available waste disposal services.140 Thus,
under the reasoning of Lefrancois, Maine's solid waste law would
not fail constitutional analysis because the Waste Management
Agency is excluding non-Maine waste from the existing landfill market (the market in which the state is participating). But the Maine
statute would fail under this analysis because of the law's "downstream" effect of banning the development of any other facilities,
thus effectively preventing interstate commerce in landfill sites.
Alternatively, opponents of the Maine statute would likely argue
that the state cannot restrict access to its landfill capacity because
there should be a "natural resource" exception to the market participant doctrine. This is suggested by the Supreme Court's ruling in
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,"50 in which the Justices held that South Dakota could refuse to sell cement from a state-owned factory to outof-state buyers during a cement shortage. The court noted that cement is not a natural resource but the result of a complex industrial
process, concluding therefore that "[w]hatever limits might exist on
a State's ability to invoke the [market participant] exemption to
hoard resources which by happenstance are found there, those limits
do not apply here."'' 51 Since hydrogeological and environmental conditions suitable for landfills do, unlike cement, occur by happenstance, the Court could use a challenge to the Maine statute as the
53
occasion for explicitly carving out a natural resources exception.1
147. Id. at 1211.
148. Id. at 1211-12.
149. Id.
150. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
151. Id. at 444.
152. The Third Circuit declined such an invitation in Swin, calling the natural
resources exception a "difficult question" that it need not reach because landfill space
is not a natural resource. Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d at
252. Rather, relying on Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (state could restrict the export of its groundwater because its continuing availability was not the
result of happenstance, but of prudence), the Third Circuit's panel reasoned that
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Such a development, however, seems highly improbable. While
Maine was struggling with its flawed landfill siting process, the U.S.
Supreme Court was making clear its ongoing disinclination to permit states to erect garbage barriers. The question quickly became a
political one, as the U.S. Senate took steps toward having Congress
give states the authority that the judiciary has so carefully withheld.
Preceding the High Court's 1992 rulings on garbage commerce,
the justices denied certiorari in National Solid Wastes Management
Association v. Alabama Department of Environmental Management,15 letting stand the Eleventh Circuit's determination that Alabama's restriction on hazardous waste importation violated the
Commerce Clause even though that restriction fell short of an outright ban and the waste was (contrary to the situation in City of
Philadelphia) ostensibly being regulated because it is inherently
dangerous.154 "The [Alabama law] plainly distinguishes among
wastes based on their origin, with no other basis for the distinction,"
the court ruled. 55
Then, on June 1, 1992, the Supreme Court all but eliminated the
notion that the Commerce Clause would ever allow barriers to interstate trade in trash. Over the vociferous objection of Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justice Blackmun, the rest of the Court held in
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of
landfill space does not occur by happenstance, Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming
County, 245 F.2d at 252, and further noted that any natural resources exception
could not be invoked simply because landfills are built on land. Id. at 253. But the
court went on to suggest that a natural resources exception might apply in a situation
where there is evidence that the particular kind of land needed for landfills, as distinguished from land in general, is a scarce commodity. Id.
153. 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990), modified, 924 F.2d 1001, cert. denied, 111
S.Ct. 2800 (1991).
154. Thus the Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that hazardous waste is
something a state could ban importation of based on its right to quarantine highly
dangerous articles. This is of local interest to Maine readers because such an argument springs from Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986), holding that Maine could
ban the import of baitfish carrying an undesirable parasite.
155. National Solid Wastes Management v. Alabama Dep't of Envt'l. Management, 910 F.2d 713, 720 (1990). Note that in this case Alabama did not invoke the
market participant doctrine, but relied more broadly on its police powers and the fact
that the state was not closing its borders to all imported hazardous waste. Rather, it
closed its borders only to hazardous waste from states that were not in compliance
with federal hazardous waste law (specifically, the federal law requiring that states
make provisions for capacity to dispose of hazardous waste generated within their
own borders). Id. But in general policy terms, the court let it be known that it sees no
distinction from City of Philadelphia based on the hazardous nature of the waste
involved-something worth noting with respect to special waste, whose asserted dangerousness drives efforts to restrict its importation into Maine. The Eleventh Circuit,
with the Supreme Court's implicit approval, closed its comment on the subject by
noting that only Congress has the authority to restrict the movement of all waste. Id.
at 721-22.
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Natural Resources 56 that a state cannot authorize local governments to ban out-of-county waste. And, in an accompanying case,
the Court (with Rehnquist alone dissenting) ruled in Chemical
Waste Management v. Hunt 5 7 that states cannot impose a special
fee on waste imported for landfilling from outside the state's
borders.
The state of Michigan's argument in Fort Gratiot, which convinced the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, was that a ban on out-ofcounty waste does not violate the Commerce Clause because such a
ban treats all non-local waste equally, whether it comes from a
neighboring county in Michigan or the profligate garbage producers
beyond Michigan's borders. 58 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens did not merely disagree, but suggested that the Supreme Court
had dispatched such a notion as unconstitutional more than a century ago. 159 Political subdivisions of a state, White declared, cannot
do what the Commerce Clause prohibits states from doing.100 He
went on to reject the health and safety argument, reasoning that
Michigan trash and non-Michigan trash are equally hazardous (or
non-hazardous) to the well-being of Michigan residents."0 Stevens
stated unequivocally that neither state had succeeded in digging out
from under the City of Philadelphiainterstate garbage.1 ' 2 As far as
the United States Supreme Court is concerned, our nation of fifty
states is one big landfill, indivisible, with garbage and interstate
commerce for all. This unequivocal reaffirmation of City of Philadelphia, after more than a decade of legislative bids to tunnel
around it, has already begun to reverberate through state trash statutes, and state trash piles around the country." 3
156. 112 S.Ct. 2019 (1992).
157. 112 S.Ct. 2009 (1992).
158. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112
S.Ct. 2019, 2023 (citing Bill Kettewell Excavating, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural
Resources, 931 F.2d 413, 417 (6th Cir. 1991)).
159. Justice Stevens cited Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891) (special inspection fees on meat slaughtered more than 100 miles from point of sale), and Dean Milk
Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (city ordinance banning sale of milk as pasteurized if it was processed more than five miles from downtown). Fort Gratiot Landfill v.
Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S.Ct. at 2025.
160. Id. at 2024.
161. Id. at 2027-28. Justice Stevens carefully distinguished this case from Maine
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986), stating that Michigan had failed to do what Maine
succeeded in doing in the case of the baitfish importation ban Proving that the state
had legitimate reason, based on other characteristics than state of origin, for banning
a particular article of commerce. Id.
162. Id. at 2023-24, 2028.
163. See, e.g., Southern States Landfill v. Georgia Dep't of Natural Resources,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12093. The District Court, citing Chemical Waste Manage-

ment v. Hunt and Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, invalidated a Georgia statute imposing a $10 per ton fee on out-of-state waste imported for landfilling. Id. at "19. The
drafters of the Georgia statute in question wrote their law so that the fee did not
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As he did in City of Philadelphia,Chief Justice Rehnquist refused in Fort Gratiot or Hunt to condemn what he regards as a
laudable local attempt to preserve environmental quality by eschewing what Mainers would call trash "from away." In Fort Gratiot,
Rehnquist was able to attract the support of Justice Blackmun, apparently by urging a remand rather than an outright affirmation of
the Michigan statute.1" In Hunt, Rehnquist would have affirmed
the Alabama tax on non-Alabama hazardous waste, and attracted no
support from his colleagues for his notion that it is not Alabama
that is seeking economic isolation, but the thirty-four states that
have no hazardous waste facilities within their borders.105
In other words, Rehnquist refused to see this as a Commerce
Clause problem. 166 One might fault the Chief Justice for resolutely
ignoring the fact that the article of commerce in question is landfill
space, highly tangible if not terribly fungible, but one must also
sympathize with his effort to grapple with a problem never envisioned by the founders of the republic. The drafters of the Constitution would have been bewildered by the notion of interstate garbage
shipments, not because this commodity was less ubiquitous then-at
least one "garbologist" thinks there may have been more trash per
capita before the industrial revolution167 than there is now-but because environmental awareness generally and concerns about toxic
chemicals in garbage particularly were unknown in 1789. So, in a
sense, Rehnquist is doing what his forebears on the Court did during
the Lochner era. He is seeking constitutional legitimacy for natural
law. But the natural law that masked a mere policy preference
explicitly apply to out-of-state waste, but only to "special solid waste," defined as
waste not subject to regulation under Section 12-8-24 of the Georgia law. Id. at *7
(citing GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-22(34) (1992)). Duly following this obfuscatory trail, the
court noted that the only waste not subject to such regulation is waste that originates
outside of Georgia and, "consequently, 'special solid waste' is really just another
name for out-of-state waste." Id. at *8.
164. Fort Gratiot Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S.Ct. at
2028 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Justices Rehnquist and Blackmun would have remanded for a determination as to whether the county-by-county approach to regulating waste importation in Michigan flows from legitimate health and safety concerns
rather than economic protectionism. Id. The majority trashed that suggestion summarily by noting that Michigan had not sought such a remand nor suggested it could
"further health and safety concerns that cannot adequately be served by nondiscriminatory alternatives." Id. at 2027 n.8.
165. Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S.Ct. at 2017. (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). Note that Maine is among the 34 states that do not contain facilities for
the disposal of hazardous waste.
166. See, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist's assertion that he is "baffled" by
the majority's view that the Fort Gratiot Landfill case involves garbage being bought
and sold since the garbage is not being purchased. Fort Gratiot Landfill v. Michigan
Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S.Ct. at 2028 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
167.

WILLIAM RATHJE AND CULLEN MURPHY, RUBBISH!: THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF GAR-

BAGE 50-51

(1992).
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against statutes the U.S. Supreme Court dealt with in the Lochner
era is altogether different from the truly natural law of entropy with
which Rehnquist, and all of modern trash jurisprudence, seeks to
grapple. For the Chief Justice, the entropical reality forces the Constitution to embrace a doctrine of environmental protectionism, or
"the commonsense notion that those responsible for a problem
should be responsible for its solution to the degree that they are
responsible for the problem but not further."'""
Enter Senator Max Baucus, Democrat of Montana, and his proposed Interstate Transportation of Municipal Waste Act of 1992,110
passed by the Senate on July 23, 1992 by an overwhelming 89-2 vote
and sent to the House of Representatives. The Baucus bill would
allow state governors to limit, or in some instances altogether ban,
70
waste importation if requested by an "affected local government."'
The governor of a state that imports more than a million tons of
out-of-state municipal waste per year could restrict but not elimi7
nate waste imports without the request of any local government.' '
While the Baucus bill would thus effectively neutralize much of
City of Philadelphiaand its recent progeny, it does not give states
like Maine carte blanche to stop the garbage haulers at the border.1 72 And Maine and other states that would seek to isolate themselves from out-of-state waste will still confront a judiciary determined to detect the bouquet of protectionism in such garbage
initiatives. States that would rely on legislative largesse with respect
to warding off the hostile judiciary would do well to bear in mind
that Congressional sympathy for protectionist measures is rooted in
the perception that some states are being forced to become regional
landfills for their more populous neighbors.1 3 Where Maine's stat168. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,
112 S.Ct. at 2029 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Such views may endear Rehnquist to
opponents of landfills, but such opponents will be dismayed to discover that he bases

his view that communities should solve their own waste problems and no other on a
potentially misguided faith in engineered systems like liners and leachate collection
systems. Id. at 2030. One wonders how Chief Justice Rehnquist would rule on a case
involving Maine's siting criteria in light of his conclusion that "siting a modern landfill can now proceed largely independent of the landfill location's particular geological

characteristics." Id.
169. S.2877, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
170. Id. § 2 (proposed amendment to 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949 (1992)).
171. Id. (proposed section 4011(a)(2)).
172. See, for example, id. at proposed section 4011(b), providing some sweeping
exceptions to a governor's authority to limit waste importation. In particular, governors could not block importation by landfills that were previously in compliance with
all relevant state and local environmental and waste disposal laws. Note, also, that
such "grandfathering" raises the potential for antitrust problems in states like Maine
where the number of previously permitted commercial landfills is very small and the
Baucus bill would add new commercial disincentives to the development of new

facilities.
173. See, e.g., Press Conference with Senator Dan Coates, FED

NEWS

SEarv, June
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ute has helped transform the state from a net waste importer to a
net waste exporter (with no facility within its borders for hazardous
,waste), both Congress and the federal courts would have no trouble
turning against the Maine Solid Waste Act as a matter of law or
policy. Maine can no more divorce itself from the regional or national waste disposal conundrum than it can isolate itself from the
rest of the U.S. economy.
VII. THE "NIMBY" PROBLEM
No assessment of the Maine Waste Management Act could reasonably ignore the extent to which the legislation met one of its primary objections vis & vis the siting of solid waste facilities: defusion
of the so-called NIMBY, or "Not In My Back Yard," phenomenon.
One journalist observing the phenomenon described it as the inevitability that "[a]ny project for the greater public good will be
strongly opposed by local residents.' 1 74 One legal scholar has called
NIMBY "the art, if you will, of using public participation and organized grassroots opposition to keep out what [towns and citizens'
1 75
groups] want to keep out."
One finds a dearth of material in the legal literature that supports
the so-called NIMBY movement, and much commentary that is contemptuous of such activism. 7 ' Perhaps a more constructive view of
1, 1992, in which Senator Coates reacts to the Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill and
Hunt decisions handed down that day. Coates approvingly cited Chief Justice Rehnquist's statement in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill that the Commerce Clause does
not "require[] cheap land states to become the waste repositories for their brethren."
Id. (quoting Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S.Ct. at 2030). Coates went on to complain that New York "has increased its exports 400 percent, while Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and
many other states continue to be dumping grounds for out-of-state trash." Id.
174. Tux Turkel, Battle Over Ash Dump Plan a Classic Case of NIMBY, ME.
SUNDAY TELEGRAM, Nov. 13, 1988, at 19A.
175. Orlando E. Delogu, "NIMBY" Is a National Environmental Problem, 35
S.D. L. REv. 198 (1990) (footnote omitted). Delogu admits that "[o]ne must readily
concede there is more than a little legitimacy to concerns over siting, particularly
hazardous waste or other high risk facilities." Id. at n.3. The Delogu article is of particular interest because, like the framers of the Maine solid waste law, Delogu was
reacting in part to the failure of the proposed Township 30 landfill in Washington
County, Maine. See, e.g., id. at 203, n.19; 206, n.27; and 213, n.47. Despite his call for
sweeping anti-NIMBY legislation on the federal level, arguably similar in approach to
the Maine statute, id. at 212-19, Delogu appears to concede that NIMBY opposition
was not the reason the Township 30 landfill was never built. "[T]here is credible
reason to believe that the ultimate rejection of . . .[the Township 30 site] was because fit was] unsuitable on the basis of a wide range of objective criteria that...
[the Board of Environmental Protection and the Land Use Regulation Commission)
brought to bear." Id. at 207, n.29.
176. Most commonly this appears as the phrase "NIMBY syndrome." See, e.g., id.
at 198; Julienne I. Adler, United States' Waste Export Control Program: Burying
Our Neighbors in Garbage, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 885, 887 n.14 (1991) ("Public opposition
to landfills and incinerators is termed the NIMBY-not in my back-
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NIMBY is to regard it as what a Maine commentator has termed
"trickle-up policy"' " whereby local opposition to something like a

waste disposal facility imposes new costs and pressures on the body
politic generally, leading to a broad policy shift toward alternatives
to disposal facilities, such as recycling.17 Under this view, the
NIMBY activism fails to become a "syndrome" because the local
opposition is merely the first step toward a more broad coalescence;
"[t]hrough such exercises, community values emerge and are reaffirmed, obliquely and subtly, but vigorously nonetheless. The search
for common values often begins with common opposition.""'
This has arguably occurred in Maine since the first anti-landfill
NIMBY groups emerged in the mid-1980s. Activists who opposed
yard-syndrome."); Geo-Tech Reclamation Indus., Inc. v. Hamrick, 886 F.2d 662, 666
(4th Cir. 1989) ("[S]elf-interest, bias or ignorance. . . are but a few of the less than
noble motivations commonly referred to as the 'Not-in-My-Backyard' syndrome.");
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 766 F. Supp. 431, 433 (D.
S.C. 1991) ("Many states and localities succumbed to the not in my backyard
('NIMBY') syndrome."); Greenberg v. Veteran, 710 F. Supp. 962, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
("This case, at its core, is unmistakably a product of the 'NIMBY Syndrome'....").
Others, eschewing the disease metaphor, have nonetheless been equally contemptuous. See, e.g., In re John Meaker, 588 A.2d 1362, 1367 (Vt. 1991) (Dooley, J., dissenting) ("We are in serious danger of expanding not-in-my-backyard into not anywhere."). But see Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part H1 - Localism and Legal
Theory, 90 COLUN. L. REV. 346, 443 n.412 (1990) ("'NIMBY' is often an unfair pejorative term. NIMBY problems may arise as a result of failure of upper level governments ... to give sufficient notice to or adequately consult with affected communities. .. ."). For general assessments of the NIMBY phenomenon, see also Denis J.
Brion, An Essay on LULU, NIMBY, and the Problem of Distributive Justice, 15 B.C.
ENvrL. AFF. L. Rv.437 (1988) (tracing the roots of the NIMBY "movement"); Carol
Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategiesfor Common Resources, 1991 DuKE L.J. 1; James Krier, The PoliticalEconomy of Barry Commoner,
20 ENVL L. 11 (1990); William L. Kovacs and Anthony A. Anderson, States as Uarket Participantsin Solid Waste Disposal Services-Fair Competition or the Destruction of the Private Sector?, 18 ENVTL L. 779 (1988); William L. Andreen, Defusing the "Not In My Backyard" Syndrome: An Approach to Federal Preemption of
State and Local Impediments to the Siting of PCB Disposal Facilities, 63 N.C. L
REv. 811 (1985); David Pomper, Comment, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey:
The Dormant Commerce Clause, Postindustrial"Natural"Resources, and the Solid
Waste Crisis, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1309 (1989); and Mary Beth Arnett, Down in the
Dumps and Wasted: The Need Determinationin the Wisconsin Landfill Siting Process, 1987 Wis. L. Rv.543.
Whatever the legal profession's view of the NIMBY phenomenon, the waste indus.
try has advanced the political argument that "NIMBY-ists" are a major threat to
their business. See, e.g., Bill Richards, Burning Issue: Energy from Garbage Loses
Some Promise as Wave of the Future, THE WALL STair' JoRNAL., June 16, 1988, at
1, quoting a spokesperson for the nation's largest incinerator developer as stating that
"[t]echnology can solve most of the problems, but it's hard to demonstrate that a 15story incinerator won't be noticed in the neighborhood."
177. Wayne Curtis, The Virtues of NIMBY, HAnrrA. J. M
AUDUBON Soc'Y, 24,
25 (Feb. 1991).
178. Id.
179. Id.

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:81

the development in 1986 of the Hebo-Hybo landfill in Lebanon have
remained involved in the process, assisting subsequent landfill opponents in Norridgewock and Washington County and lobbying at the
State House. An abutting landowner to the proposed Arundel landfill cross-examined witnesses in 1991 when the Board of Environmental Protection considered the expansion of the Norridgewock facility. The leader of the Township 30 anti-landfill group went on to
run an independent campaign for governor. It does not seem farfetched to conclude that the broad policy shift embodied in the
Maine Waste Management Act, away from landfilling and toward
source reduction, reuse and recycling is attributable at least in part
to the "trickle-up" phenomenon.
Nevertheless, the Act also sought to "cure" the NIMBY "syndrome" with provisions designed to thwart local opposition to facility siting. The creation of a centralized, government-run siting
mechanism and objective criteria to guide that mechanism was an
attempt to assure that no locality could argue that it was being unfairly singled out for political reasons. Township 30 landfill opponents vehemently asserted this argument. But the quid pro quo was
Section 2173 of the Act-somewhat ironically included in the subchapter entitled "host community benefits"-limiting municipal jurisdiction over facilities created by the Agency or regional government entities."1 0 Under this provision, municipalities are
circumscribed in their authority to enact local solid waste ordinances; pursuant to such ordinances municipal authorities may "issue a local permit containing the same findings, conclusions and
conditions contained in the license issued by the [D]epartment [of
Environmental Protection]. . ."'".

Municipalities may only attach

do not "unreasonably readditional conditions if those conditions
1 82
strict the operation of the facility.1

Divesting municipal governments of their right to veto a disposal
site within their borders has not, however, had the effect of thwarting the NIMBY movement. Adherents to the "disease" metaphor
must concede that the "syndrome" grew all the more virulent during
the landfill siting process that culminated in January, 1992; NIMBY
groups sprang up in most if not all localities named as potential candidate sites by the Agency. Among those municipalities that became
official "candidate sites," virtually each one set about hiring attorneys and consultants in an effort to erect every possible barricade to
landfill siting. "Trickle up" theorists will see a positive development
here in the awakening to activism among citizens previously
uninvolved in solid waste policy.
The principle of mutual interdependence would force the environ180.
181.
182.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2173 (West Supp. 1991-1992).
Id.
Id.
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mental activist to agree with the landfill developer that it is not appropriate for a community that reaps the benefits of globally-derived wealth to enjoy a summary veto of responsibility for the byproducts of that wealth. But, of course, this is also true of the state
that seeks to erect barriers to the importation of waste from other
states. The failure of the Maine Waste Management Act to stop
NIMBY activism testifies to the futility of such preventive measures; even the most inarticulately and selfishly shouted demands
for accountability have value. Landfill developers, whether ultimately answerable to stockholders or voters, should be forced to
prove that their incursions into the backyards of America are environmentally unassailable.
VII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Notwithstanding the good faith of everyone involved, and recognizing that budget crises have sharply limited the Maine Waste
Management Agency's ability to accomplish its multifaceted mission, the landfill siting provisions of the Maine Waste Management
Act have proven themselves to be a legislative experiment that has
failed. At a time when devoting attention and resources to innovative recycling and source reduction programs would have administered a boost to the 'economy and the achievement of the policy
goals of the Act, the Agency spent upwards of $400,000 in consulting
fees and studies alone on a doomed search for landfill whose need
was anything but established. 183 Had the process been allowed to
continue, litigation would in all likelihood have invalidated the siting program, both because of the constitutional insufficiency of the
statute itself and because of the procedural inadequacies of the
Waste Management Agency's activities. The Legislature should
devote attention in 1993 to a comprehensive rewrite of the Maine
Waste Management Act.
Critical to that task is the recognition, reluctant though it may be,
that the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits Maine
from seeking to ban the importation of waste as contemplated by
the present version of the Act. If it is true that avaricious waste
entrepreneurs are conspiring to foist mountains of toxic residue on
allegedly helpless states like Maine, Congress is the appropriate
body to confront this problem. A strictly worded provision imposing
strict, joint and several liability on the developers as well as the contributors of any leachate leaking from a special waste landfill would
be a welcome safeguard."" This would attenuate the profit motive in
183. Jill Higgins, Biddeford-Arundel Spared as Dump Site, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, Jan. 10, 1992, at 1.
184. See, e.g., the liability provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-

sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9607
(1988)).
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the expedient development of commercial landfills and act as an economic disincentive to the generation of waste generally. Freed from
the need to establish Maine as a market participant, state government could absent itself from an enterprise that it is ill qualified to
undertake.""5
The proper scope of the Agency's role in facility development is to
assure that proposed facilities operate in conformance with the
waste management hierarchy of source reduction, reuse, recycling,
composting, processing and finally landfilling. 186 A revised statute,
requiring such a capacity needs determination from the Agency as a
precondition to permitting from environmental agencies, should
clarify the present criteria to state that a developer, whether private
or public, must affirmatively demonstrate that it has taken steps to
subject any waste landfilled or incinerated to each preceding step in
the hierarchy. Conformity to the hierarchy should take precedence
over all other criteria.
The other criteria must be divested of their vagueness so it is
clear which ones take precedence. The most troubling one, relating
to soils, must cease to be a conundrum whereby landfills move inexorably toward wetlands, the development of which is prohibited by
federal laws. Two things should occur: The law and the regulations
should recognize that glacial tills (such as those found in Norridgewock) are suitable for development, and the federal government should resolve its current muddle over definition of wetlands.
Once wetlands are properly defined (and they should be defined
strictly) the Maine statute should clarify that their exploitation as
landfill sites is unacceptable as a matter of state and federal law.
Several other states in the northeast have adopted approaches
that Maine would do well to emulate. Massachusetts and Rhode Island both require the developer of any landfill to engage in negotia185. The Act itself as presently worded concedes that development and operation

of landfills is best left in private hands. The statute calls for the Agency to "provide
for solid waste disposal facilities by contracting with private vendors for facility design, construction or operation or, if necessary, undertaking facility development itself." ME. REV.

STAT. ANN.

tit. 38, § 2156(2) (West Supp. 1990-1991). This provision of

the Act was something of a boon to the private landfill companies the statute was
intended to disenfranchise, since it freed the companies from the most irksome aspect
of their business (site selection, acquisition and permitting) and mandated that the
state hire them, presumably at levels that allowed a reasonable profit, to do what the

companies feel they do best-run the waste facilities.
186. See supra note 3. It is worth noting that the Agency and the Facility Siting
Board have themselves effectively conceded that they are ill-suited to the task of
finding the best possible site for a landfill-even given the broad power of eminent
domain that private developers do not enjoy. The Agency and Board have conceded
that "it is not practical to obtain the resource data needed to identify the theoretically 'best' landfill site" and that suggestions to the contrary engender "false expectations." Maine Facility Siting Bd. Reg. 450 (Aug. 19, 1992), Basis Statement at 2.
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tions with the host municipality. 187 This has the effect of directing
NIMBY energy into a constructive partnership with the developer
whereby benefits (i.e., profits) and liabilities are shared equitably.
Since 1970, New Jersey has subjected waste disposal facilities to
price regulation by the state's public service commission. 's Such a
reform is long overdue in Maine. The antitrust division of the Maine
Department of the Attorney General has repeatedly urged such a
move on the Legislature, noting that the barriers to entry-whether
the business be incinerators or commercial landfills, are so high as to
create an oligopoly with nearly unfettered market power. (The present ban on commercial landfill development, combined with the
provision that permits existing facilities to expand, arguably gives
the present owners of commercial landfills absolute market power.)
Thus, successful efforts by the MERC and PERC incinerators, beginning in 1989 to tear up all municipal disposal contracts and renegotiate them is best viewed in the context of a decade in which disposal prices generally have risen by an order of magnitude.' 8 Any
reestablishment of the private sector's role in waste management
without the simultaneous establishment of price regulation would be
an act of sublime irresponsibility. Waste management facilities have
become essential public services just as power and telephone companies have, and, as with those utilities, economic efficiency suggests
the public's waste management needs are best served by regulated
monopolies.' 90
Even the most responsible-minded and sober observer of the
evolution in Maine's solid waste policy during the past six years
would have to concede that what has transpired was more soap-opera than problem solving. When University of Arizona's famed "garbage archaeologist," William Rathje, recently warned against adopting a crisis stance with respect to garbage policy making, surely the
Maine Waste Management Act and its landfill siting process were
among the "ill conceived and counterproductive initiatives" he had
in mind. 19'
187. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21D, § 12 (West 1991) and R.L GEN, LAws §
22.19.7-5 (1991).
188. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-27 (West 1991).
189. Note that submission of the rate increase requests by MERC and PERC to
the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) probably would have resulted in their approval as reasonable under the circumstances.
190. Defining waste facilities as essential, regulated public service enterprises
would also have the potential effect of justifying the exercise of eminent domain for
development of such facilities-provided that the regulatory agency must certify the
existence of the need as the PUC presently does with the companies it regulates.
191. WLLLi RATHJE AND CULLEN MURPHY, RUBBISH! THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF GARBAGE 238 (1992). Rathje does not mention Maine in his book, but the first of his "ten
commandments" of garbage policy is, "Don't think of our garbage problems in terms
of a crisis." Id. "Our garbage is not about to overwhelm us; there are a number of
options available; and most communities have time to think about those options and
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Development of new facilities pursuant to the Act has been at a
near standstill, but so has the implementation of the waste management hierarchy that was supposed to move Maine away from the
wholesale generation of trash. Week upon week of hearings have
taken place fro m Machias to Buxton, full of sound and fury but signifying nothing. Meantime, entropy has continued to wreak its inexorable havoc. Maine deserves a solid waste policy that slows entropy
as much as practicable, thereby prolonging the usefulness of at least
the small corner of the planet under Maine's jurisdiction.
Donald Maurice Kreis

choose among them wisely." Id. This clearly applies to Maine.

